Even Israel’s friends overseas often have trouble understanding its conduct in the Israel-Hamas war and its ancillary conflicts with Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis. While some may be forgiving about the high numbers of civilian casualties as an inevitable part of urban warfare, it is harder for many to swallow Israel’s reluctance to allow enough humanitarian aid to reach Gaza or its seeming indifference to the massive collateral deaths involved in rescuing hostages and targeting Hamas leaders. Many are mystified by Israel’s willingness to risk what could be a devastating war with Lebanon’s Hezbollah or Iran. The back-to-back assassinations at the end of July of senior Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr and Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh were unusual displays of state violence by the standards of any government, much less one that regards itself as a liberal democracy.
Israel has traditionally taken an aggressive military stance toward its enemies. But in the 10 months since the outbreak of the war in Gaza it has become more lethal than ever—killing some 40,000 people in Gaza alone. Israel’s harshest critics assert that its purpose is to destroy the last vestiges of Palestinian nationalism—or worse, to commit genocide against Palestinians. But the real explanation for the change is more complicated.
The aim of Israel’s ultra-nationalist right is, in fact, to make life unbearable for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. However, only a small minority of Israelis hold such extreme views, and the far-right ministers who echo them have little or no say over war policy. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been careful to keep that under his personal control with a handful of like-minded officials.
Where the extreme right does have an impact—and mostly an indirect one—is on humanitarian issues. Far-right leaders don’t have so much a war strategy as a desire to see Palestinians suffer and for the war to go on. Anxious to ensure that the extreme right remains in the governing coalition, Netanyahu has bent to their will by taking a tough line on cease-fire negotiations and has only enabled sufficient humanitarian aid to reach Gaza when international pressure left him no choice. As Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, the leader of the rightist Religious Zionist Party, told a conference of rightists on Aug. 5, he would have no problem allowing the people of Gaza to starve. “We bring in aid because there is no choice,” he explained by way of an apology to his audience.
National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has allowed inhumane conditions at the Sde Teiman detention facility for Palestinians arrested in the war to fester by refusing to move inmates to the civilian facilities under his control. He called nine soldiers suspected of sexually abusing a prisoner at Sde Teiman “our best heroes” and may have told police to back off when rightist extremists tried to block their arrest by military police last month.
To a degree, a desire for punishment and revenge is shared by the troops in Gaza, including the vast majority who have no use for the extreme right. The atrocities of Oct. 7, which remain very much alive in the Israeli consciousness, have inevitably left many soldiers at best indifferent to Palestinian suffering and at worst out for revenge. The military advocate general, Maj. Gen. Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi, said in June that she was investigating some 70 cases of alleged wrongdoing, and that is only the tip of the iceberg.
Some observers contend that Israelis have become more violent, or at least more tolerant of violence. Certainly, among extremist settlers violence toward Palestinians has grown and is regarded as a legitimate tool to further their political ends. But even among settlers, they represent a small minority. Overall, the rate of violent crime in Israel is low by developed-country standards and until last year had been falling.
In all events, the actions of soldiers on the ground in Gaza don’t explain what is clearly a change in Israeli policy at the top. Here, the decisions made by Israel’s political and military leaders to order assassinations, bomb the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah at a cost of 80 Yemeni lives for one Israeli, or risk war with Iran reflect a new realpolitik.
In the wake of their momentous victory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Israelis had gradually come to feel that their country’s existence was no longer imperiled. It was a gradual process that developed as one Arab country after another either reached peace agreements with Israel and acknowledged its existence (Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco) or lost the capability to mount a war (Syria). Normalization with Saudi Arabia looked to be on the horizon. The rise of the high-tech economy, growing foreign investment, and two decades of buoyant economic growth that turned Israel into a powerful and prosperous economy seemed to confirm that. The talk turned into how to “contain” the Palestinian conversation because no solution was needed.
This Weltanschauung had practical effects. From the early 1990s, defense spending as a share of gross domestic product declined. Of the three pillars of its defense strategy—victory in war, deterrence, and intelligence—Israel abandoned the first, allowed the second to erode, and therefore became overly reliant on the third. From the 1980s, Israel’s wars with unconventional forces never ended in decisive victory. With that, Israel’s ability to deter its enemies waned, as evidenced by Hamas’s willingness to repeatedly go to war with Israel from 2008 on. In place of decisive victory and effective deterrence, Israel came to rely more and more on defensive measures—walls, fences, and high-tech early-warning systems.
Israel paid a steep price for these policies on Oct. 7. Even if it quickly turned back the Hamas attack, Iran and its proxies appreciated the magnitude of the intelligence and organizational failure. Hezbollah began attacks over Israel’s northern border just a day later and the Houthis were soon firing missiles and drones at Red Sea shipping and Israel itself. In April, Iran crossed a red line in its long-running conflict with Israel by staging for the first time a direct missile and drone attack rather than using proxies.
The “total victory” that Netanyahu promises is unlikely to ever be achieved against Hamas, much less against Hezbollah or Iran. Restoring Israel’s deterrent ability is a more realistic goal, but not a painless one. Facing non-state actors with an ideological commitment to ending Israel’s existence, it is not enough to demonstrate effective defensive capabilities. It requires a willingness to strike out even in response to relatively small provocations and to go on the offensive.
For policymakers and public opinion in the United States and Europe, Israel’s recent actions seem dangerous and disproportionate, and there is no denying they risk sparking a regional war. But Israel doesn’t have very good choices. Despite its image as an always-triumphant military power, it is worthwhile remembering that Israel is a small country in terms of population, geography, and economy. It cannot afford to be taken by surprise, fight long wars, or maintain a heightened defense posture indefinitely. Israel now fully appreciates that for every new friend it has in the region, it has an implacable enemy. The Middle East remains a tough place.
The ordinary Israeli isn’t party to the calculations behind restoring deterrence. Public opinion nevertheless backs the country’s newly aggressive stance for more existential reasons.
The Hamas attack of Oct. 7 did not pose a fundamental threat to Israel, but its psychological impact was profound. For Israelis, the images of terrorists engaged in an orgy of murder, rape, and kidnapping were a tangible reminder that the threat to Israel’s existence was not idle talk by its enemies and that the consequences of even a brief moment of failure to secure the country’s borders would be severe. The months of pummeling of the country’s north by Hezbollah rockets, drones, and anti-tank missiles and the Iranian missile barrage in April have given Israelis a taste of how the end may come.
Yossi Klein Halevi captured the new national mood in a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed: “Even as we maintain the pretense of daily life, a part of us is permanently alert. We tell ourselves that we’re steady and joke about the apocalypse, because that’s the Israeli way. But during one recent sleepless night, I literally jumped when a passing motorcycle sounded like an explosion.”
Opinion surveys bear that out. An Israel Democracy Institute poll found that those expressing optimism about the future of Israel’s national security had dropped from close to 47 percent in November 2023, when the war in Gaza appeared to be going well, to 31 percent in June. Another recent survey by the Institute for National Security Studies showed that just a quarter of Israelis have a high or very high sense of personal security.
Israel faces a unique threat among nations at war or threatened with it. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping would like to erase Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively, from the map, but neither wants to destroy or expel the Ukrainian or Taiwanese people. Not that life would likely be pleasant under their rule, but the Ukrainians or Taiwanese would be allowed to remain in their homes and live their lives, albeit as Russian and Chinese citizens. These are (or will be) wars of empire and conquest. Israel faces the threat of existence. For a time, Israelis thought otherwise—they no longer do.
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