When Russia began its military intervention in Syria in 2015, shifting the civil war’s momentum in favor of the Assad regime, many in the West grew concerned about the Kremlin’s intentions. They feared that Russia’s return to the Middle East was not only to support the authoritarian regime in Syria but also to form an alliance with other anti-Western forces in the region, including Iran.
However, almost a decade later, with wars raging in both Europe and the Middle East, Tehran and Moscow’s partnership in the war-torn country seems to be undergoing significant changes, with the previous symmetry in favor of Russia now leaning toward Iran.
Following the launch of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia—strapped for resources—withdrew and redeployed a number of its troops, alongside some of its weaponry including the S-300 air defense system, from Syria to the front lines in Ukraine. In 2023, after the Russian paramilitary group Wagner waged a mutiny against the Kremlin, resulting weeks later in the death of the mercenary group’s chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s activities in Syria were brought to heel by the Russian army and the Assad regime—resulting in a further pullback of Russian troops.
These developments sparked initial optimism among some Western observers who believed that Russia’s reduced presence in the Middle East might allow the U.S.-led Western coalition to bolster its influence in the region. Many viewed the withdrawal as a positive development, hoping it would at least prevent a new era of regional conflict among major powers.
However, Russia’s withdrawal from Syria has ushered in a new chapter of the conflict. While the retreat might have reduced concerns about the return of great power rivalry to the Middle East, the absence of the Kremlin’s influence has created a power vacuum in country’s south that is being quickly filled by Iranian and Hezbollah troops—making the situation far more complicated for the U.S. even as its focus and resources remain divided between Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel.
Russia has reaped substantial benefits from its intervention in Syria. It holds a near-monopoly over the exploitation of Syria’s gas and oil fields and is set to secure reconstruction contracts from the Syrian government. More importantly, since 1971, when the Soviet Union first obtained Syria’s permission to establish a naval facility at the Tartus port, Russia has maintained a strong military presence in the country which has only grown in the last decade. During the Syrian civil war, Damascus permitted the Russian Air Force to build the Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia. The base houses maritime strike bombers and, alongside the naval base in Tartus, provides Moscow with a strategic presence against NATO’s southern flank in the Mediterranean Sea.
Accumulating these gains has naturally made the Russians cautious about triggering any unnecessary conflict. Thus, Russia has operated in Syria with a more rational approach. In contrast, Iran and Hezbollah are driven by both ambition and ideology. Their primary goal is the containment—or even destruction—of the state of Israel, a goal that Russia does not share.
Knowing that a conflict with Israel could result in devastating Israeli airstrikes and upset the balance of power between the Assad regime and the northern rebels, Russia has intermittently acted as a restraining force against Iran’s expansion in Syria. In 2018, when the rapid increase of Iranian-backed troops in southern Syria along the border with Israel led to a surge in Israel’s aerial attacks and major escalation in the region, Russia took action. Moscow pressured Iran to withdraw its forces, armed with heavy weaponry and less than 55 miles away from the Israeli border, and reached a deal with Tel Aviv to manage the escalation in Syria.
More recently, when Iran launched its drone and missile strike on Israel earlier this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin urged all sides to “show reasonable restraint” and prevent another round of fighting which would have “catastrophic consequences for the entire region.”
In contrast, since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Iran and Hezbollah have actively sought to open a new front against Israel. According to reports, Hezbollah has expanded its activities from Daraa in the south of Syria to Aleppo in the north and now operates more than 100 sites in the country. Similarly, according to the Israeli Defense Forces, Iran operates 13 military bases across the country, drawing from five divisions of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps troops and often collaborating with Hezbollah.
Additionally, Iran has established a new proxy group in Syria, the Imam Hussein Division, also known as Syrian Hezbollah, composed of a whopping 6,000 fighters from various countries including Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq. Alongside attempting to open a new front against Israel in Syria, Iran and its proxies have also endeavored to smuggle weapons to the West Bank using drones and local smugglers and criminal groups.
As opposed to Russia, which seeks to maintain good relations with various ethnic and religious groups in Syria, including the Sunni majority, Iran has pursued its sectarian agenda in Syria through different means. For instance, one of the main Russia-backed groups, the Palestinian Quds Brigade (also known as Liwa al-Quds or the Syrian Arab Army Fedayeen), which is active in Aleppo, is both composed of and commanded by Sunnis. In contrast, Iran has launched a campaign to resettle Shiites into certain parts of the country like Deir ez-Zor, by aggressively purchasing land and sending migrant construction workers to Syria in an attempt to bolster its influence.
This shift in power poses new challenges for all key players: Russia, Israel, and the West. Increased Iranian and Hezbollah presence in Syria and the consequent threat of a wider war in the Middle East could jeopardize Russia’s gains.
In addition, the absence of Russians as a restraining force paves the ground for Iran’s and Hezbollah’s expansion, complicating the situation for Israel, already battling with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. On Saturday, a rocket launched from Lebanon killed 12 children and teenagers in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (Israel annexed the strategic plateau from Syria in 1967, during the Six-Day War). In retaliation, Israel launched an airstrike against a Hezbollah commander in Beirut on Tuesday. As Iran and its proxies expand their influence in Syria, a new front could emerge, further diverting Israeli resources and attention and stretching the Israel Defense Forces’ capacity.
As for the West, though a post-Soviet Russia has been trying to maintain a relatively friendly relationship with Israel, it may not always be that way. Iran still remains Russia’s top military backer in its war against Ukraine. As the war drags on well into its third year and Iran and Hezbollah consolidate their influence in Syria, Russia could be dragged further into the Axis of Resistance campaign—turning Moscow against Tel Aviv. Such a scenario risks reviving a Cold War-era environment, where Russia, aligning more closely with anti-American and anti-Israeli forces, contributes to increased regional tensions and instability.
Although the Russian withdrawal might initially appear to be a boon for the West, it ultimately introduces new challenges and uncertainties in the Middle East. What may initially seem like a strategic opportunity due to the reduced influence of a major rival, the reality is that the power vacuum left by Russia has been quickly filled by Iranian and Hezbollah forces. This shift could drag the U.S. and its allies into a conflict with Iran’s Axis of Resistance, as their advancement in Syria might provoke a strong response from Israel, potentially triggering a chain of events.
In the absence of any easy options to remove Iran and Hezbollah from Syria, the best alternative for the U.S. government could be to maintain its military presence in Syria and resume supportive relations with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). While maintaining military presence is solely in the hands of Washington, the future of SDF largely depends on Turkey. If Ankara decides to normalize relations with Syria, the SDF, designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, could become even more vulnerable. In this context, the U.S. might need to consider establishing clear boundaries with Turkey or expanding its military footprint in the north.
Evidently, as long as there are military threats to Bashar al-Assad’s government on the ground in Syria, members of the Axis of Resistance will be cautious in pursuing an ambitious agenda against Israel that could trigger a two-fold conflict in the region: with Israel in the south and the United States in the east and north.
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