Israel’s July 31 assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and its July 30 strike targeting Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut may herald a worsening conflict between Israel and Lebanon. These operations came after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to inflict a “heavy price” on Hezbollah for a rocket attack that killed 12 children on a soccer field in Majdal Shams, a Druze town in the Israel-controlled Golan Heights. Both sides may back away from further escalation, but that is far from guaranteed—and a war would be disastrous for both sides.
Since the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023, Hezbollah has launched thousands of rockets and missiles into Israel as well as fired anti-tank guided missiles at targets along the border. Israel has responded with air and artillery strikes on Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as by assassinating Hezbollah commanders. The death toll is around 350 Hezbollah fighters and 100 Lebanese civilians, along with 23 Israeli soldiers and 17 civilians. The near-constant fighting has displaced 60,000 Israelis from northern Israel and almost 100,000 people from the Lebanese side of the border.
If the conflict broadens, Hezbollah’s massive rocket and missile arsenal and hardened military forces would pose a major threat to Israel, with the disruption likely to be far more massive than Israel has experienced in decades, even including the Oct. 7 attack. The Israeli military, however, has long prepared for this war, and its campaign would likely be both skilled and savage, devastating Lebanon as well as Hezbollah.
A war might also spread to nearby Syria and Iraq, both of which have Iranian partner forces that are aligned with Hezbollah and have substantial rocket, missile, and drone capabilities that can reach Israel. The Houthis in Yemen could also back Hezbollah in the conflict and continue their war against Israel, even if the fighting stops in Gaza.
Although a major war would be devastating, it may come anyway. It’s difficult to calibrate violence, and retaliatory strikes can create a dangerous circle of conflict. The Israeli government and its population after Oct. 7 are in no mood to tolerate potential threats along their borders. Because of the risk of war, the United States should continue efforts to mediate a cease-fire but also prepare for failure.
Hezbollah, one of the most heavily armed nonstate groups in the world, poses a much more serious air threat to Israel than Hamas does. Thanks in part to Iranian aid and technical assistance, Hezbollah has a much larger arsenal of between 120,000 and 200,000 rockets and missiles. The majority are likely drones and short- and long-range unguided rockets, such as the Burkan, Fajr-3, and Fajr-5 rockets. Hezbollah also possesses more lethal short- and intermediate-range unguided ballistic missiles, such as the Zelzal-1, Zelzal-2, and Scud B, C, and D variants. Most dangerous are the Fateh-110 M-600 variant short-range guided ballistic missiles, which are precision-guided munitions. Also used by Russia in its war on Ukraine, the Fateh-110 has a range of 250 to 300 kilometers (155 to 186 miles), capable of reaching all of Israel’s populated areas.
In addition to this formidable rocket and missile arsenal, Hezbollah has some of the most skilled fighters in the Middle East. From its birth in the early 1980s, Hezbollah fought the Israeli military, eventually pushing it out of Lebanon in 2000 by force of arms—the only clear Arab military victory over Israel. Six years later, Israel and Hezbollah fought a 34-day war that ended in a draw, leaving neither side eager to repeat the experience.
Hezbollah intervened almost from the start in the Syrian civil war in 2011, working with Iran and the Syrian government to keep the Assad regime in power. In addition to becoming battle-hardened, Hezbollah forces coordinated with the Russian air force after Moscow intervened in 2015 and worked closely with Iran’s elite Quds Force, which played a critical role in shoring up the Syrian government. These hardened troops are skilled; enjoy a high level of morale; are capable of complex operations, such as the integration of ground maneuver with suppressive fires; and can keep fighting even in the face of brutal conflict.
Some of the skills learned, such as urban counterinsurgency, may be less relevant to a fight with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and the significant losses Hezbollah suffered make it leery of another war. But should war come, Hezbollah will be ready. Its fighters will be fighting defensively from prepared positions on terrain they know well. Hezbollah fighters also possess anti-tank guided missiles, man-portable air defense systems, and surface-to-air missiles systems. In addition, Hezbollah has sophisticated improvised explosive devices, including the explosively formed penetrators that Iranian-backed groups used in Iraq against U.S. forces and that are capable of punching through armored personnel carriers and tanks.
In the 2006 war, Hezbollah revealed that it had held in reserve sophisticated weapons such as anti-ship cruise missiles, using them to strike an Israeli warship successfully. Since then, Hezbollah has expanded its anti-ship missile arsenal with Russian help. Also in 2006, Hezbollah demonstrated that it had a massive tunnel network, and this continued in the years that followed: In 2019, Israel found one tunnel that was 22 stories deep. As Israel learned in Lebanon in 2006 and again in Gaza since 2022, tunnels are a nightmare for military operations, requiring skilled personnel to clear and enabling defenders to conduct ambushes and attempt surprise capture operations.
Still, Israel has a seasoned, battle-hardened military and a significant advantage in technological capabilities, from fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II stealth aircraft to one of the most sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile inventories in the Middle East. The Israeli military would also enter Lebanon with overwhelming firepower and would quickly shatter any large-scale Hezbollah resistance, forcing the group to largely fight as small units and guerrillas, for which it has likely prepared. Israel has also trained regularly to fight Hezbollah: Unlike Hamas, which Israel badly underestimated prior to Oct. 7, the IDF has a well-earned respect for Hezbollah’s capabilities.
The Israeli military, however, has been at war for the better part of a year in Gaza, with no immediate end in sight. Israel relies on its reserves for major operations, such as in Gaza, and any reservists have done multiple tours, straining Israel’s society and economy. The Israeli military is also low on ammunition and spare parts and would find it difficult to locate the resources for the massive demands of an all-out conflict with Hezbollah.
One important question is how each side uses drone warfare. The Russia-Ukraine war has shown how the use of drones is transforming warfare, especially when used in combined arms operations. They can be used for early warning, battlefield awareness, targeting for standoff attacks, strike, electronic warfare, and information operations, as well as integrated with infantry, direct and indirect fire, aviation, and other joint capabilities. The war in Ukraine has also resulted in major innovations in counter-drone warfare, including electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, and air and missile defense systems. Israel, a pioneer in the use of drones, uses them for almost all aspects of its air operations, while Hezbollah has also used drones for reconnaissance and to attack Israel. Hezbollah has perhaps 2,000 drones, most of which Iran provided.
More broadly, both Hezbollah and the Israeli military are learning organizations. As Israel has been preparing for this conflict since 2006, its military has likely gathered considerable intelligence, developed concepts of operations suitable to southern Lebanon, and otherwise prepared to avoid a repeat of the last conflict. But Hezbollah is not a static actor, and, with Iranian and perhaps Russian help, it too has prepared for another round.
War has a way of making fools of analysts seeking to predict its nature and outcome: Few expected Ukraine’s military to resist Russian aggression so effectively, to take only one recent example. Whether Hezbollah can resist an Israeli onslaught and how much suffering it is prepared to endure remain unknown. Similarly, who will innovate and adapt most effectively will only be known when—or if—the conflict commences.
The United States should try to foster peace while preparing for an expanded conflict. The efforts of Amos Hochstein, the Biden administration’s point person on Lebanon, to secure a cease-fire are commendable and should continue. At the same time, however, the United States should prepare to counter any greater Iranian involvement, and that of its proxies in Iraq and Syria, and make it clear to Hezbollah that if it escalates further, the United States will strongly back Israel.
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