Of the many political ads for the upcoming parliamentary elections in North Macedonia, one stands out. It depicts a soccer game in which one of the teams is wearing the colors of the country, and the other is made up of players wearing different-colored shirts, including neighboring countries such as Bulgaria and Greece, as well as a referee wearing the flag of the European Union.
While both teams are going at it, all of a sudden, out of nowhere, one of the candidates running for office steps onto the field, stops play, and boldly states, “Macedonia’s future isn’t a game.”
If the country’s politics were a game, though, North Macedonians have felt like they’ve been on the losing side for the past six years. Amid a backdrop of partisan bickering, corruption scandals, and stalled reforms, the country’s progress toward joining the EU, which has been one of its main strategic goals for the past couple of decades, has been stymied.
Despite years of painstaking efforts and reforms, progress toward accession has been agonizingly slow and riddled with setbacks.
It has also been caught up in geopolitical competition. Over the past few years, particularly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Macedonia has consistently supported Ukraine and has aligned its foreign policy and values with those of Western nations.
In the process, it has also proved to be a deterrent to Russian influence in the region. The country swiftly answered the call to support Ukraine by providing crucial military, technical, and humanitarian aid, through the delivery of 12 aid packages worth 60 million euros. Moreover, in the two-plus years since the war began, the nation has taken a strong stance by expelling 17 Russian diplomats.
Now, faced with simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections on May 8, the tiny Balkan country of around 2 million people is seeking a path forward. While the Social Democrats are striving to garner support to maintain the country’s European future, the opposition right-wing VMRO-DPMNE has toed a nationalist line, setting the stage for a political showdown that will shape the country’s trajectory for years to come.
Political gridlock between the two biggest political parties, the Social Democratic Union (SDSM) and the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE, has hindered the implementation of much-needed reforms and political agreements. Meanwhile, public trust in the current government, run by the Social Democrats, has diminished, as it missed opportunities, failed to deliver on promises, and was plagued by scandals during its two consecutive terms leading parliament.
The ruling SDSM thought that it had secured the EU negotiations back in June 2018, when it signed the much-coveted name change agreement with its larger neighbor, Greece, a member of the EU, renaming itself to North Macedonia. The name change stipulated that North Macedonia could now fully pursue its EU membership as well as become a part of NATO, which it did in 2020.
However, the initial hopes didn’t last long. In October 2019, disaster struck once again when French President Emmanuel Macron blocked the start of negotiations with candidates North Macedonia and Albania. At the time, Macron stated that a significant restructuring of the EU enlargement process was necessary before negotiations could begin.
A year later, just as the process seemed back on track, another one of North Macedonia’s EU neighboring countries, Bulgaria, introduced another obstacle.
This time, Sofia blocked the EU accession talks due to bilateral historical disputes, including the roots of North Macedonia’s language. Effectively, the decision also initiated the ending of the reign of the then-prime minister and architect of the agreements with Bulgaria and Greece, Zoran Zaev.
The politician who succeeded Zaev as prime minister and leader of the SDSM in January 2022 and December 2021, respectively, Dimitar Kovacevski, immediately found himself faced with the difficult task of lifting the blockade. The following period also saw both countries agreeing to a so-called French proposal (made during the French presidency of the EU from January to June 2022) to advance the EU integration of North Macedonia and Albania. Through the proposal, Sofia signaled its readiness to withdraw its veto on Skopje’s integration once North Macedonia acknowledges the country’s Bulgarian minority in its constitution.
However, the proposed amendments to North Macedonia’s constitution, aiming to recognize Bulgarians among the nation’s founding nationalities, to this day remain in a state of limbo. The opposition vehemently opposes the proposal, and SDSM lacks the necessary votes to secure passage in a parliamentary vote. A change of the country’s constitution requires a two-thirds majority in the 120-seat parliament.
Such developments, further fueled by the broken promises for a swift European integration process, severely undermined the party’s credibility. SDSM’s tenure was further rocked by scandals resulting in the arrest and conviction of two party general secretaries, Dragi Rashkovski and Muhamed Zekiri, for abuse of office. Additionally, another prominent member of Zaev’s government, Kocho Angjushev, was blacklisted by the U.S. State Department over his role in alleged significant corruption and abuse of office, further tarnishing the government’s already-weak reputation.
Over the past eight years, the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE has grappled with its legacy at the helm of an authoritarian regime, marked by the dramatic departure of former party leader and Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski to Hungary, where he sought and obtained political asylum, evading a two-year corruption sentence. Many of the party’s high officials were also tried and prosecuted for various corruption scandals during their 2006-2016 rule.
However, the first round of the presidential election on April 24 marked a significant turnaround for the party. Its candidate, Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova, secured a resounding victory over the current president, SDSM-backed Stevo Pendarovski, by a 2-to-1 margin.
In the upcoming second and final round of the presidential election, Siljanovska-Davkova and Pendarovski will once more go head to head, while the two parties strategize on how to secure the votes of those who backed candidates eliminated in the previous round. With about 37 percent of voters undecided, the competition for these important votes heats up alongside the parliamentary campaigns.
The outcome from the first round, however, has fueled VMRO-DPMNE’s optimism for the upcoming parliamentary elections, raising expectations of a triumphant return to power.
Additionally, many of North Macedonia’s citizens still haven’t gotten over the country’s controversial name change, something that VMRO-DPMNE has also been capitalizing on, using it as a rallying point to garner support and bolster its campaign platform.
The party also chose a familiar-sounding slogan for its presidential campaign: “Make Macedonia proud again,” a nostalgic appeal that seems to resonate with many voters no matter the country.
According to party leader Hristijan Mickoski, they won’t accept constitutional changes under, as he says, “Bulgarian dictation” at any cost, and their proposed solution for the problem will come only after the elections.
Furthermore, the party has also been trying to get rid of its image as the instigator of a notorious incident on April 27, 2017, when protesters and VMRO-DPMNE supporters violently stormed North Macedonia’s parliament.
The fallout from the ordeal has resulted in 29 people being sentenced to prison, and while VMRO-DPMNE has never admitted to having a part in the events, most of the public has viewed it as complicit or at least indirectly involved in the scandal. Its political rivals, the Social Democrats, have frequently used this idea in their election campaigns, urging citizens to avoid what they call a “repeat of April 27.”
Beyond the two main parties, there are other potential kingmakers and dark horses. The Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), the dominant force within the country’s Albanian political bloc (the largest minority), has held significant sway as a power broker, playing a pivotal role in nearly every government since 2002, with the exception of the one in 2006. The party emerged in the aftermath of the 2001 armed conflict between the Albanian militant group called the National Liberation Army and Macedonian security forces.
As the third-biggest political party in the country, the DUI is now faced with the prospect of being potentially excluded from joining a ruling coalition, as the front-runner, VMRO-DPMNE, persistently advocates for it to be placed in opposition. In turn, this has drawn the ire of the party’s longtime leader, Ali Ahmeti, known for frequently employing nationalist rhetoric and slogans supporting the Kosovo Liberation Army and the branch he himself later created in the country, the National Liberation Army.
The party’s slogan during the election campaign has been “No to Russia, Yes to Europe,” with the current foreign affairs minister, Bujar Osmani, a DUI leader, claiming on many occasions that Russia has been employing deliberate disinformation tactics to disrupt the social cohesion in the country and hinder its progress toward EU accession.
Osmani, the party’s presidential candidate who garnered an impressive 13.7 percent of first-round votes, has also echoed the DUI’s political stance, placing EU integration at the forefront of his campaign agenda.
Although Russia’s involvement in the country and the wider region hasn’t been a focal point of the election campaign, certain smaller parties have flirted with the notion of North Macedonia forging closer ties with Moscow.
Levica (the Left) is one of them, and it is also one of the parties that has been gaining prominence and attracting an increasing number of supporters. The leftist nationalist party has been categorically against North Macedonia’s NATO membership, the agreements with Greece and Bulgaria, and the Ohrid framework—a peace deal signed by the Macedonian government and representatives of the Albanian minority in 2001.
In March 2022, amid the escalating Russian military offensive in Ukraine, Levica’s members of parliament had a meeting with Russian Ambassador Sergey Bazdnikin. Soon after, a Levica party delegation attended a parade in Moscow and engaged in discussions with the leader of the Communist Party of Russia.
While its preferred candidate’s showing in the first round of the presidential election proved to be modest (4.7 percent), the party could gain momentum and broaden its appeal in the upcoming parliamentary election by capitalizing on the growing dissatisfaction with the EU integration process.
Former SDSM party official turned outcast, Maksim Dimitrievski, is another wild-card factor in the upcoming elections with his political party, For Our Macedonia (ZNAM). Dimitrievski was expelled from the SDSM in 2021, after deciding to run as an independent during local elections.
During the first round of the presidential election, Dimitrievski garnered a solid 9.5 percent, effectively siphoning off a substantial portion of SDSM support.
Last but not least, there is VLEN, a coalition of several smaller Albanian political parties that serves as the legitimate opposition of the DUI, and whose candidate, Arben Taravari, won over 9 percent of first-round presidential votes. The party’s electoral campaign has been firmly focused on advancing minority rights and supporting the adoption of the constitutional amendments to pave the way for the country’s European future.
VMRO-DPMNE has already begun exploring the possibility of forming a ruling coalition, which would include itself, the Albanian opposition, and the ZNAM party. However, the different stances that these parties have on the adoption of the constitutional amendments will be a major point of disagreement and negotiation in any potential coalition talks.
While it may seem far-fetched, the reemergence of a familiar coalition between SDSM and DUI, albeit with diminished influence compared to previous governments, could potentially materialize once more, possibly with the involvement of some of the dark-horse contenders. However, such an arrangement would require significant concessions from various parties on the issue of constitutional amendments. Finally, if neither of the major parties can establish a government, there’s a chance for a technocratic government to step in.
This week’s elections will serve as a stark reflection of the mood within the country—where voters are frustrated with the way European integration has progressed and eager for a much-needed overhaul of the country’s many broken institutions. There is also the question of whether the United States’ influence over North Macedonia is beginning to wane, and, if so, whether such limbo opens the door further for other malign actors to exert their influence.
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