This Thursday, Colombian President Gustavo Petro will be in Washington, D.C., where he will meet with U.S. President Joe Biden at the White House for the first time. The conversation could get awkward. Petro, Colombia’s first leftist leader, has brought about major shifts in Colombia’s approach to Venezuela and counternarcotics policy, upending long-standing pillars of this strategic alliance.
This Thursday, Colombian President Gustavo Petro will be in Washington, D.C., where he will meet with U.S. President Joe Biden at the White House for the first time. The conversation could get awkward. Petro, Colombia’s first leftist leader, has brought about major shifts in Colombia’s approach to Venezuela and counternarcotics policy, upending long-standing pillars of this strategic alliance.
Yet in other areas, Petro presents opportunities for even closer ties, particularly on climate and the energy transition, both priorities for the Biden administration. Should the United States increase its support for Colombia to meet its environmental goals, it would compensate for disagreements elsewhere, generate economic and social benefits in Colombia, and offer a compelling example of how wealthy countries can support ambitious environmental policies in developing nations.
Petro has made fighting climate change and advancing a just transition away from fossil fuels some of his top goals. In March, his government announced the key pillars of its new energy transition strategy, including boosting clean energy production, enhancing energy efficiency, and the reindustrialization of the economy. The transition will be a colossal undertaking: Colombia’s energy and mining sector accounts for 7 percent of GDP, a third of foreign investment, nearly 60 percent of total exports, and more than half a million formal jobs.
Yet Petro recognizes that all nations, with developed countries leading the way, must accelerate climate action, especially in the energy sector. The latest report from the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change shows that to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, the world needs to substantially reduce the use of existing fossil fuels and leave most unextracted reserves in the ground. To get on the right track, scientists say global emissions must peak by 2025, and be nearly halved by 2030, to achieve the 1.5 Celsius limit.
For that reason, Petro’s ambitious climate and energy agenda merits far greater international support. On its own, Colombia has built a reputation as a trailblazer in climate action. In 2012, it was one of the first developing countries to announce a low carbon development strategy. More recently, it increased its targets, pledging to reduce emissions by 51 percent compared to projected 2030 emissions, and to reach net zero emissions by 2050.
But without international support, Colombia will face enormous challenges to achieve these targets. That is especially true in regards to reducing the high levels of deforestation that represent the bulk of its emissions. Colombia also needs help to accelerate its transition to electric vehicles, phase out fossil fuel power generation, eliminate fossil fuel subsidies, and reduce its reliance on oil and coal exports.
Importantly, Colombia needs support not only to reduce emissions, but also to restructure its economy as the global energy transition accelerates. In 2022, global investment in low-carbon technologies—such as renewable energy, energy storage, and electric vehicles—hit a record $1.1 trillion. These trends will likely pick up speed as the costs of low-carbon technologies drop further and the United States, China, and Europe continue to plow hundreds of billions of dollars into these technologies. Fossil fuel-exporting countries such as Colombia will see public revenue decline and an increased threat of stranded assets. To help the world limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, Latin American oil production should decline to less than 4 million barrels per day. That means that as much as 81 percent of proven, probable, and possible oil reserves will remain underground. The fiscal impact would be huge, with estimates suggesting regional oil exporters could lose up to around $3 trillion in royalties by 2035 if strong global climate action materializes.
Though Colombia is not a significant emitter, it could model a successful transformation. That is why the United States should rebalance the relationship to focus more on climate and energy cooperation. For starters, building on existing high-level dialogues, the countries should establish a working group on climate change to drive U.S. government and private sector investment and technical support to increase Colombia’s capacity to combat deforestation and advance an orderly and just energy transition.
Getting a grip on deforestation will require addressing a range of governance and security challenges, including chronic violence against social and environmental leaders, and transnational criminal networks that profit from cutting down trees.
The United States, alongside international partners, could work with Colombia to create a so-called “Just Energy Transition Partnership” that goes beyond financing decarbonization efforts to help move Colombia’s economy away from its reliance on fossil fuels. To support that transformation, the United States should also help Colombia’s national and local governments, industry, and civil society to build new engines of growth in renewable energy, low-carbon agriculture, electric transport, and ecotourism. That would create opportunities for workers displaced by this transition and assure that a reduction in fossil fuel production does not increase domestic energy costs or reduce the government’s ability to fund social programs.
The United States and its partners should also help by advancing reforms to the international financial architecture, as called for by the Bridgetown Initiative, to generate additional capital for climate action in Colombia and elsewhere. This would involve greater multilateral development bank lending for climate action. On its own, the United States should ease lending restrictions on high- and upper-middle income countries that complicate U.S. support for renewable energy production and for expanding transmission lines to carry electricity from remote windy and sunny regions to cities. Finally, the United States should support Colombia’s calls for debt relief in exchange for climate action.
As Colombia’s most important international ally, its main energy partner, and the world’s largest historical carbon emitter, the United States has a unique responsibility and capacity to support Petro’s climate and energy goals. These goals also present an opportunity for the United States to help shape the global energy transition by demonstrating that climate action can truly be an economic engine. It would also give the Biden administration a chance to really step up following an underwhelming encounter in February at the White House with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, during which the United States did not announce a major contribution to the Amazon Fund, despite rhetoric that the environment would be a top priority. Finally, a close partnership between Biden and Petro on these issues would ease potential tensions over foreign-policy and security disagreements while demonstrating U.S. capacity to partner with progressive governments in Latin America.
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