Wars can sometimes turn on the most seemingly insignificant factors.
Time will show whether Russia’s decision to abandon Snake Island – which for the sake of analysis we will take at face value for now – is one such moment.
Snake Island is that tiny lump of rock in the Black Sea, 20km off the south-west tip of Ukraine and made famous in the early days of this war with the resolute call from the defenders for the Russian warship shelling them to “go f—” itself.
The frigate in question, the Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, was later sunk in one of the most stunning blows Ukraine has landed on her invader since February 24.
As the war has ebbed and flowed on land, the island has proved critical for both sides.
In Russian hands, the port of Odesa would forever face the threat of Russian amphibious troops assaulting under a protective air defence umbrella installed on the island.
Russian ownership of the rock would also make any attempt to export grain from Ukraine almost impossible. No insurance company in the world would dare take the risk of underwriting such a dangerous passage without Russian agreement, and any deal would have been offered by Moscow at too high a price for the West to bear.
Now though, Russia says it has lost interest in the island, possibly as a result of Ukraine deploying French Caesar self-propelled artillery systems in Odesa, making any potential assault on the city much harder.
The Kremlin may have judged any extra security conferred by having Russian forces on Snake Island would be markedly diminished given the deployment of the long-range weapon systems.
If Russia has given up its ambition of taking Odesa and the whole south coast of the country in a bid to strangle Ukraine’s economy, it is a huge development.
For all the many setbacks his forces have suffered and the highly doubtful claim this war was all about protecting the people of the Donbas all along, Putin’s desire to turn the whole of Ukraine into a client state has never diminished.
Allowing Kyiv’s main economic lifeline to survive makes that task much more difficult.
Ukrainian ownership of Snake Island – which it will no doubt quickly populate with air and sea defences – could also unlock the issue of grain supplies.
It will be dangerous work, but removing Russian mines from the sea will be possible if the threat from the remnants of Moscow’s Black Sea fleet is reduced.
Turkey is likely to be critical here. As custodian of the Montreux Convention, which controls access through the Bosphorus Strait in times of conflict, Ankara’s naval forces could take the lead in clearing the way and escorting out civilian ships.
Other Black Sea nations such as Romania and Bulgaria might also be involved. Nato members, of course, but not operating as a Nato mission.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, is currently in Madrid at a summit with other Nato leaders. Perhaps a deal on this very issue is being hammered out on Thursday.
Snake Island is one tiny piece of real estate, camped out in the north-west corner of the Black Sea.
In Ukrainian hands however, the threat to Russia’s Black Sea fleet will go up, the risk of an amphibious assault on Odesa will go down, the chances of the Kremlin smashing Ukraine’s economy is reduced and Putin’s stranglehold over the provision of grain to the world’s poorest regions, and indeed food prices globally, is weakened – as will his economy be when prices settle.
Tactical actions can sometimes have strategic effects. Wars can be won or lost over the smallest details.
Whether that blasted chunk of rock in the Black Sea is one such detail will be revealed, probably sooner than later.
The post How Russia’s retreat from Snake Island could restart the grain trade appeared first on The Telegraph.
