At first glance, Saks looked like exactly the kind of mess hedge funds love.
Just months after the company borrowed $2.2 billion to finance its takeover of rival Neiman Marcus, the newly formed luxury retail powerhouse was already running short on cash. Creditors spooked by the pace of the slide rushed for the exits, offering the bonds for less than 40 cents on the dollar.
Bargain-hunting hedge funds gleefully took the debt off their hands. This was, after all, a marquee name with valuable brands, prime real estate, big-name backers and a business that executives said just needed a bit more time to steady itself. Firms including Pentwater Capital Management and Bracebridge Capital jumped in, chasing the promise of eye-popping returns.
Much is still to be determined in the wake of Saks’ bankruptcy this week, including any recovery for its creditors. Yet in the meantime, the episode is shaping up to be a painful lesson in the dangers of trying to catch a falling knife. The bonds that distressed-debt shops snapped up on the cheap are now being bid at less than 1 cent, according to broker runs. The hundreds of millions in extra financing they provided, which sits higher in the repayment pecking order, isn’t faring much better, changing hands around 10 cents.
Through Saks’ Chapter 11 filing, a clearer picture has emerged of a company that quickly veered off plan. Targets were missed, savings failed to materialize, cash drained at a rapid clip, and fixes meant to stop the bleeding never did. Bonds with roughly $486 million of face value held by Pentwater are now quoted at pennies on the dollar, as are about $257 million held by Bracebridge.
“This was a ticking time bomb, and the fuse was lit the day the merger was consummated,” said Mark Cohen, the former director of retail studies at Columbia Business School. “I’ve never seen anything go bad this fast; I don’t know that anyone has.”
A representative for Saks declined to comment beyond the company’s bankruptcy filing. Pentwater and Bracebridge declined to comment.
Even after the staggering declines, Saks’ biggest creditors aren’t ready to throw in the towel.
In its bankruptcy filing, the company said it had secured roughly $1.75 billion in post-petition financing, including $1.5 billion from a group of senior secured bondholders betting a second act could yet salvage the retailer — and their own fortunes, possibly by converting battered debt positions into significant equity stakes.
Some will also collect fees for helping arrange the financing. What’s more, the structure of the post-bankruptcy financing Saks has lined up could allow certain debtholders to realize better returns on the company’s outstanding bonds than where they’re currently trading, some investors suggested.
Pentwater and Bracebridge are among those putting up more money, according to people with knowledge of the matter.
‘Presumptively Worthless’
Whether it’s enough to turn around a company that burned through more cash than it generated last year remains to be seen. Perennially late payments have “damaged trust” with Saks’ suppliers, the retailer said in bankruptcy documents, and while new management is working to repair those relationships, some vendors may decide to take their business elsewhere.
The company is also facing stiff objections from unsecured creditors, including Amazon.com Inc., that are seeking to block access to the new financing package. The tech giant, which previously acquired a $475 million preferred equity stake in the luxury retailer, recently called its investment in Saks “presumptively worthless.” Other equity holders including Rhone Capital and Insight Partners also suffered significant losses, separate people familiar with the situation said.
Representatives for Amazon and Insight Partners didn’t respond to requests for comment. Rhone Capital declined to comment.
Some investors who opted not to participate in the latest debtor-in-possession financing were concerned that the rescue could echo other recent misfires. They pointed to First Brands Group, the bankrupt auto-parts supplier whose lenders put up more than $1 billion post bankruptcy, only to watch their super-senior bonds crater in value as the company burned through the cash and signaled it would need even more money.
With rescue financing, “you get a lot of structuring fees, an above-market interest rate, liens on the best collateral, an equity cushion below you, with the added upside that you’re in control as the restructuring process plays out,” said Rishi Goel, the global head of distressed debt at Aegon Asset Management.
“But it’s got to be structured correctly. The equity value below you has to be real,” Goel said. “If you’re misled, or the business is worth less than you thought or becomes worse than you thought, the value can dry up quickly.”
For now, Saks has said that stores under all its brands are open. A number of creditors say they are confident that new management, led by former Neiman Marcus Chief Executive Officer Geoffroy van Raemdonck, can steer the company through bankruptcy and, once it emerges, make its portfolio of luxury department stores profitable.
Not everyone is convinced.
“The rationale for putting these two businesses together made no sense from the get-go, and it’s hard to believe that these deep-pocketed masters of the universe fell for it,” Cohen said.
Ronalds-Hannon and Basu write for Bloomberg.
The post Painful lessons from Saks struggle: ‘I’ve never seen anything go bad this fast’ appeared first on Los Angeles Times.
