European leaders are cautiously optimistic heading into the NATO summit in The Hague. In contrast to the Brussels summit in 2018, when first-time U.S. President Donald Trump berated Europeans over their meager defense spending, allies now have something to bring to the table: a plan to reach a minimum of 5 percent of GDP in defense spending, as Trump demanded, even if 1.5 percent may go to defense-relevant infrastructure, not necessarily their militaries.
European allies have finally recognized that to secure NATO’s future, a new trans-Atlantic deal on burden sharing is needed. European countries have to take on the lion’s share of NATO’s conventional defense.
Germany will play a major role in the success of the summit and this broader mission, because it is one of the few countries in the European Union with the fiscal flexibility to spend almost unlimited amounts on defense. New Chancellor Friedrich Merz has not only streamlined Berlin’s foreign-policy decision-making and reestablished good working relations with Paris, Warsaw, and London, he also appeared to have struck a constructive tone with Trump in the Oval Office, which should help at the summit. Even before he took office, Merz paved the way for a constitutional change to allow sharply higher defense spending.
But however much European intransigence on military spending was a cause of friction in NATO in the past, it is far from certain that these positive developments will be enough to contain Trump’s personal volatility and disruptive instincts. Rather than a gradual shift towards a greater European role in the alliance, we could just as easily see a sudden U.S. abandonment of the alliance (like Trump allegedly considered at the 2018 summit). Although U.S. officials have reassured Europeans that any U.S. troop withdrawals Trump may announce at the summit will not leave gaps in NATO’s deterrence and credibility, disagreements with Trump over Russia and Ukraine—or trade and tariffs—could escalate any time and result in unexpected U.S. decisions.
There is also a threat to NATO within Europe: Although European publics accept the need for greater defense spending, a new target of 5 percent of GDP, even if it is broadly defined, will require most European countries to make painful trade-offs, including cuts to social welfare. This will provide fertile ground for pro-Russian populists on the right and left to make a tempting offer to voters: If the U.S. might not come to Europe’s defense anyway, why spend all that money on the military instead of giving in to some of Moscow’s demands? The specter of appeasement looms.
In the worst-case scenario of U.S. abandonment, Germany would be particularly vulnerable to extreme strategic and political shifts. Eastern front-line states with experiences of Russian and Soviet occupation would resist even without NATO, and Britain and France have nuclear arsenals and a long, unbroken tradition as European great powers, which would lead them through any period of strategic upheaval. Germany’s post-1945 national identity, however, is intricately connected with the concept of the West under U.S. leadership. What would Germany’s role in Europe be when there is no longer a coherent West united in NATO? Right-wing populists like the anti-U.S. Alternative for Germany have an answer: They want to see a remilitarized Germany that is much closer to Russia. This is an outcome that not even Trump could want.
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