The confused rollout of the proposed nuclear power deal with Saudi Arabia has created an opportunity to advance several vital American interests, if Congress and the administration can quickly agree on a path forward.
Despite widespread criticism and few publicly released details, it is clear that the deal could help limit the spread of nuclear weapons, strengthen U.S.-Saudi relations at a tense moment and increase the possibility of peace between the kingdom and Israel.
But the deal, which would commit the Saudis to working with American companies in developing nuclear energy, is in limbo. After his administration announced it had been signed on July 22, President Trump called the agreement into question, saying it was contingent on progress toward normalized relations between the kingdom and Israel. Critics of the deal said that it would increase the risk that Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East will pursue and obtain nuclear weapons.
Under U.S. law, a Saudi program with American involvement would already be subject to stronger controls than are required by international treaty or by any U.S. competitor, including Russia and China. Parts of the Trump deal would go still further, not only requiring U.S. consent before any Saudi uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing can take place, but also barring the transfer of sensitive technology. Inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency could verify compliance.
Insisting on even stricter controls would undermine international limits on the spread of nuclear technology by driving the Saudis and other countries seeking their own programs into the arms of competitors with looser standards. It would also undermine the cause of Middle East peace by pushing Saudi-Israeli rapprochement even further out of reach.
Mr. Trump should use the leverage provided by this moment of limbo. To do so, he must send the deal to Congress or risk missing an opportunity.
To understand why critics of the deal are wrong, and why Mr. Trump should proceed, it’s important to understand how U.S. safeguards for civilian nuclear power projects developed over the years.
After the 1973 oil crisis spurred global demand for nuclear power, fierce competition broke out among suppliers eager to displace American dominance in the global market for nuclear fuel and reactors. Rivals such as France and West Germany dangled access to uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing as sweeteners to persuade customers such as Pakistan and Brazil to buy their reactors.
India’s 1974 Smiling Buddha nuclear weapons test, which used American heavy water diverted from the Atoms for Peace program, highlighted the risk that peaceful assistance could wind up aiding the development of an atomic bomb. It eventually led the United States to persuade France and West Germany to drop their reckless offers. In turn, Congress clamped down on support for foreign nuclear power programs through the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.
It took over 30 years of arduous U.S. diplomacy to persuade other suppliers to adopt many of the more stringent standards imposed by the act, such as requiring governments to place all nuclear facilities in their countries under international safeguards and adopting dual-use export controls to prevent uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Enrichment or reprocessing technologies can be diverted to give a country the material it needs to build a nuclear weapon. Over time, other suppliers came reasonably close to the high bar the United States set in 1978.
Fast forward to the mid-2000s, when the United Arab Emirates decided to start a peaceful nuclear program to meet its need for clean power. The Emiratis voluntarily forswore pursuit of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing and codified that pledge into law. Not satisfied with this commitment, both Republican and Democratic administrations insisted the Emirates embed that pledge in its nuclear agreement with the United States, and began referring to this new “gold standard” for nuclear deals.
But the world already had a “gold standard” for nuclear deals: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as bolstered by the 1978 Nonproliferation Act. Requiring even tougher constraints unilaterally would be self-defeating. And there was nothing “standard” about the Emirates’ agreement; of the roughly two dozen other U.S. nuclear agreements only Taiwan, a special case, is similarly restrictive.
Dozens of nations are now pursuing peaceful nuclear energy programs, and Russian and Chinese suitors in turn are pitching their own competing programs. Insisting on a chimerical “gold standard” will just push the Saudis and others into the waiting arms of our competitors and adversaries.
Russia boasts that its global orders for nuclear reactors amount to $200 billion over the next decade, compared to an estimated $15 billion for American vendors. China is challenging America at every turn. The United States is working hard to compete, pursuing deals in Europe, Asia and Africa. Washington has a chance to regain the nuclear leadership that our competitors have secured at our expense over decades. Making unilateral security demands sought by no other supplier and required by no international treaty will only make the risks of nuclear proliferation worse by pushing countries to suppliers with looser standards.
Saudi recognition of Israel should remain a cardinal objective of our foreign policy. But the Saudis are making that recognition contingent on the peaceful resolution of the Palestinian question, which is as far away as ever. Demanding an immediate deal with that condition will only sacrifice peaceful U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation for nothing.
In fact, the two-year feasibility study reportedly included in the deal provides both time and leverage to achieve that more ambitious outcome. Mr. Trump can use those two years to push the Saudis toward normalized relations with Israel. Without the nuclear deal, that leverage would evaporate.
Time is of the essence. By law, the Saudi agreement must have a review period in Congress of 90 days of continuous session before the president gets the authority to bring the agreement into force. With relatively few congressional days left in this election year, the administration needs to submit the agreement soon lest the clock run out and a new Congress find ways to block the deal.
If we squander the opportunity to partner with the Saudis now, rest assured that we will lower the bar against proliferation in the Middle East and beyond. The Saudis could still get their reactors without the “gold standard” that critics of the deal say they want and without any American role in the future of their program. That would be a profound loss for our national security.
Daniel Poneman is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council.
Source images by Tetra Images/Winslow Productions and tiero/Getty Images
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: [email protected].
Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Bluesky, WhatsApp and Threads.
The post Critics of the U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Have It Exactly Wrong appeared first on New York Times.
