The Trump administration’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has made the waterway one more testing ground in a battle of wills. The question isn’t whether Iran or the United States has the more powerful navy, but which country can endure economic pain and military casualties longer—the United States, which has been waging an unpopular war of choice in the Middle East, or the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is fighting for its survival.
Since the beginning of the war, Tehran has allowed vessels of its choosing to pay a toll to pass through the strait. In this way, it has been able to continue selling its oil at a high price while also profiting from the tolls. Iran is now demanding that any ship that wants to transit the strait must also deviate from the normal lanes into Iranian waters near Qeshm Island and be inspected by members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
In its counterblockade, the United States is stipulating that no ship that pays a toll will be allowed through. It is also denying transit to ships that enter or leave Iranian ports, which would presumably include those that deviated from the normal routes so as to be inspected in Iranian waters. Ships that comply with U.S. demands risk being attacked by Iran, and ships that comply with Iranian demands risk being detained by the United States. Complying with both is impossible. And on top of that, Iran has likely laid mines in the channels most commonly used for passage.
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Enforcing the blockade could be complicated and risky for the United States diplomatically. The U.S. may have to decide, for instance, whether it will detain a Chinese-flagged vessel, or even one escorted by the Chinese, Pakistani, or Indian navies. If the United States were to board such a ship, the Chinese or other powers could retaliate economically, including through tariffs or by stepping up military or economic assistance to Iran.
Enforcement could also put American service members at risk. Visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) teams are tasked with inspecting vessels. They tend to use small, inflatable boats with a rigid hull, which are deployed from larger ships, such as destroyers and frigates. Vessels being boarded are supposed to come to a complete stop. But some ships attempting to run the blockade might refuse to be boarded and instead continue speeding ahead. The U.S. Navy would then have to decide whether to board the ship without the crew’s cooperation, which requires special training, or to disable the vessel by firing on it.
Other vessels might attempt to avoid capture by staying close to Iranian waters, which would expose the destroyers, and especially the VBSS small-boat teams, to enemy fire. Iran still reportedly possesses most of its “mosquito fleet” of small boats, which could swarm American assets that come near its coast. The Iranians could lay ambushes for VBSS teams onboard certain vessels, thereby turning seemingly compliant boardings into deadly firefights in hostile territory.
The U.S. has also pledged to disable mines that Iran has placed in the strait. This is a painfully slow process that will require teams in small boats to operate underwater drones in search of mines and then send divers to deactivate them. Mine-clearing teams may be even more vulnerable to attack than those seeking to board ships.
The U.S. warships from which all of these missions will be dispatched will have to operate much closer to Iranian territory than they did before the blockade. Iran has unmanned surface drones that can cause immense damage to warships, as Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated. The best defense against Iran’s mosquito fleet and drones is airpower—using the MH-60R helicopters onboard Navy destroyers, say. But China has reportedly sent modern shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles to Iran. Those could be used to shoot down helicopters. Just one drone, one cruise missile, one mine, or one suicide boat that gets through American defenses could put a billion-dollar guided-missile destroyer out of action for years. This has happened to U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf in the past.
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Those are the risks. They must be measured against the uncertainty of the blockade’s rewards. Iran has proved adept at evading sanctions for decades, and it will undoubtedly attempt to continue moving goods over land, via airlift, and potentially via pipelines to Pakistan. The Iranians may also avoid sanctions by using ships flagged by other countries, or those that lie about their destinations inside the Gulf. They could use small craft such as a dhow, the traditional boat in the region, which are difficult to track and impossible to stop when they travel in large numbers. VBSS teams would have to board each one.
If, in spite of all of these obstacles, the blockade does successfully shut down Iranian oil revenue, the U.S. and Iran will find themselves racing against an economic clock. Iran entered the war with a precarious economy. Oil revenue accounts for 9 percent of the country’s GDP. Total Iranian exports through the strait amount to $435 million a day—roughly a third of Iran’s GDP. An extended, successful blockade would jack up the country’s inflation rate within weeks. But it would also raise the price of gas, food, pharmaceuticals, and electronics globally. Oil futures have been held down by President Trump’s repeated hints that an end to the conflict is just around the corner. But those statements can’t indefinitely postpone the consequences of removing 20 percent of the world’s oil from the market.
The American public was never sold on the war with Iran, and Trump’s popularity has taken a hit in the lead-up to the 2026 midterms. How the blockade ends may depend on just how many casualties and how much economic pain each country and its leaders can endure. The advantage in this contest belongs to Iran—because it is not a democracy, because it is fighting near its own territory, and because its regime will do anything necessary to survive.
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