The most important thing to understand about the “madman theory” of foreign policy is that it was designed by losers for losers.
The world first heard of the madman theory from a 1978 memoir by President Richard Nixon’s former chief of staff H. R. Haldeman. According to Haldeman, Nixon said: “I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war.” Faced with an otherwise hopeless war in Vietnam, Nixon would pretend to be crazy to intimidate the North Vietnamese into allowing him some face-saving escape.
Nobody executes a madman strategy when he feels that he’s winning. Strong and successful powers emphasize consistency and predictability. So do powers that hope to be seen as strong and successful. When China’s foreign minister speaks to the world, he uses language such as “China will be a reliable force for stability” and China “is providing the greatest certainty in this uncertain world.” He understands that true power does not need to boast or yell.
Those who feel their power ebbing, however, may bluster and bellow. Over the seven weeks of his Iran war so far, Donald Trump has discovered that no amount of the force at his disposal will calm world energy markets or boost his sagging poll numbers. He has tried a double strategy of promising imminent breakthroughs in negotiations while posting ever more violent threats on social media to ostensibly accelerate those negotiations. But if this was a madman strategy, it signally failed to gain the advantage that he sought. Everyone could see that Trump wanted a deal more than his Iranian counterparts did. A good rule of thumb is that the side that wants a deal more is the side that is losing.
The madman strategy is for not-crazy leaders caught in adverse predicaments. It’s a strategy of deception. The madman strategist pretends to be willing to do things that he’s not really willing to do. This approach relies on credibility: Rivals must be able to take the threat of extreme action seriously.
[Read: Trump made a deal that gives him nothing he wanted]
Trump’s problems with this strategy are ironic. Foreign leaders are surely willing to believe that Trump is “crazy” in the sense that he is detached from reality. They have seen him miscalculate risk and bungle all kinds of projects, such as his trade wars with China and his attempted coup on January 6, 2021. But they also know that when push really comes to shove, Trump will flinch. TACO has become, like NATO, an acronym so familiar that it no longer needs spelling out.
The Iranians just executed the most dramatic TACO event in history. Trump threatened to annihilate their entire civilization if they didn’t agree to his demands to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iran defied the threat—and now Trump has apparently conceded control over the strait and the right to impose tolls on the ships that navigate it. On the point in which Trump tried hardest to terrorize, the Iranians aptly guessed that he was bluffing.
Trump has taught the world that he has every quality of the madman except indifference to pain. He likes his wars unilateral, quick, and cheap. He won’t seek consent from Congress; he cannot appeal to public opinion. He just gambles that the war will end before his poll numbers sink too deep. When this latest war of his turned difficult, he panicked. Everyone could see the panic, including the Iranians. His blood-curdling Truth Social posts—shocking as they were—proclaimed desperation, not resolve. That’s the Trump version of the madman strategy: yelling at people in the street while begging those same people for a bailout. What’s the opposite of the expression crazy like a fox?
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