The E-3 Sentry, with its distinctive rotating radar dome, is a flying command center that allows American forces to see and coordinate the battlefield. In recent weeks, Iran destroyed one on a runway in Saudi Arabia and reportedly damaged another. The United States has only a handful of E-3s deployed to the Middle East and a limited global fleet, making the aircraft one of the country’s most strategically valuable assets.
Iran probably did not act alone. A Chinese satellite firm, MizarVision, published imagery of U.S. military movements that could have aided targeting. The Daily Telegraph also reported that China provided Iran with sodium perchlorate, a precursor used for solid missile propellant. And China isn’t the only power that assisted Iran. U.S. intelligence assessments indicate that Russia supplied Iran with intelligence to target U.S. forces and advanced drone capabilities.
The Trump administration has not commented on China’s support for Iran. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt told Fox News that Russian assistance “does not really matter,” and on another occasion said that it “is not making a difference” to U.S. military operations.
[Read: Three things the consensus gets wrong about the Iran war]
Meanwhile, in a press conference on Monday—a day before Donald Trump announced a two-week cease-fire with Iran—he hammered U.S. allies, saying that NATO hasn’t “helped at all.” “It’s not just NATO,” he went on. “You know who else didn’t help us? South Korea didn’t help us. You know who else didn’t help us? Australia didn’t help us. You know who else didn’t help us? Japan.”
The war has exposed the contradictions of the Trump administration’s geopolitical worldview. Under this president, the United States has rewarded Russia, ignored China, punished Europe, and abandoned its Asian allies and partners to an economic crisis that it helped set in motion.
During the Cold War, one superpower frequently offered indirect help to the enemies of the other. The Soviet Union supported North Vietnam and North Korea, while the United States backed Afghanistan’s resistance to the Soviet invasion. This dynamic was largely absent from America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which occurred at a time when great-power competition was far more muted than it is now.
But today, conditions have again changed. In Iran, Russia would likely take the opportunity to inflict costs on U.S. forces if the cease-fire breaks down and the U.S. deploys ground troops. China is more risk averse and probably wouldn’t directly help Iran fight the United States, but it seems comfortable with providing dual-use goods, such as missile fuel, which also has civilian applications, and commercial-satellite imagery.
Russia’s and China’s assistance to Iran is part of a broader alignment of U.S. adversaries. Since the start of the Ukraine war, Moscow has deepened its ties with China, North Korea, and Iran. China has helped Russia rebuild its military capacity far more quickly than would otherwise have been possible, supplying machine tools, microelectronics, and other crucial technologies while cooperating on drone production. North Korea has provided millions of rounds of artillery ammunition, rockets, missiles, and even troops. Iran has supplied ballistic missiles as well as drones and assistance in manufacturing them.
Russia has not received this help for free. In return, it has transferred valuable military technology to each of these countries, including for fighter jets, air defenses, satellites and missiles, and submarines. Moscow and Pyongyang have signed a mutual-defense treaty, and North Korea has benefited significantly from Russian military and economic assistance. Russia and China don’t have a formal alliance treaty, but Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have met more than 50 times and deepened their military, economic, and technological cooperation.
The Trump administration has still somehow failed to recognize the significance of this shift. In 2025, the U.S. intelligence community warned about the risks of adversary cooperation; then, in 2026, without new evidence, it dismissed those concerns as overstated. The National Security Strategy did not address the issue, and no senior Trump-administration official has spoken publicly about North Korea’s role in the Ukraine war.
Rather, Trump seems to believe that there are no fixed blocs, and that he can work pragmatically with almost all countries, regardless of their geopolitical orientation. After the Iran war broke out, Trump lifted oil sanctions on Russia, compounding the massive financial boom it enjoyed from the increase in oil prices. The administration continues to pursue a major trade deal with China, at the expense of competing with China strategically.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has focused its ire on Europe for withholding support for the war in Iran. Trump called NATO a “paper tiger” and said that he is seriously considering pulling out of it. In practice, most European allies have facilitated U.S. operations with bases, airspace, and logistics. Only one, Spain, has imposed a blanket ban on assistance, but that decision has had little practical impact on the war.
Before the cease-fire, Trump had repeatedly said that Europe should act to open the Strait of Hormuz because it gets much of its oil from there, whereas the U.S. gets almost none. (Yesterday, Iran said it has agreed to allow ships safe passage through the waterway if they coordinate with its military. The details of the agreement, however, remain unclear.) But according to the International Energy Agency, only about 4 percent of the crude oil that transits the strait goes to Europe. Trump had also claimed that the strait was safe to patrol, which was clearly not true, because the U.S. Navy was unwilling to escort oil tankers through it.
Trump has rejected help that would have made a real difference. Ukrainian forces have spent years developing techniques for intercepting Iranian drones at scale, precisely the threat the Gulf States have faced. President Volodymyr Zelensky offered to assist. Trump could have embedded Ukrainian advisers in Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, turning hard-won battlefield knowledge into a force multiplier at minimal cost. Instead, he waved it away, saying, “We don’t need their help in drone defense. We know more about drones than anybody.”
The consequences of the energy crisis are particularly visible in Asia. Asian economies receive roughly 80 percent of the crude oil and almost 90 percent of the liquefied natural gas that transit the Strait of Hormuz, making them acutely vulnerable to disruption. The region also relies heavily on the Gulf States for refined products, including fertilizer, chemicals, and industrial fuel. Evan Feigenbaum of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace paints a “grim picture” for Asia weeks into the war—including school closures, rationing, work-from-home directives, and water shortages—owing to fuel price increases or shortages caused by the conflict. The two-week cease-fire is unlikely to immediately resolve these issues; shipping through the strait may still be reduced compared to prewar levels.
The United States is nowhere to be found as Asian allies cope with the worst energy crisis in 50 years. There has been no G-20 emergency meeting. No visit by the Treasury secretary to the region. No acknowledgment of the problem. Just a lambasting of U.S. treaty allies for not joining in.
The Iran war came on the back of a year in which the U.S. has levied tariffs on its allies and partners without much forethought or strategy. In the absence of U.S. leadership, Asian nations were seeking to cut deals with Tehran, more out of desperation to avert economic disaster than from any geopolitical preference. If the strait does not fully open under the cease-fire, that pattern could continue.
The Iran war has laid bare a new geopolitical reality. America’s adversaries are becoming more coordinated, sharing resources and capabilities in ways that amplify their power, while America’s global alliances, long its greatest asset, are neglected and fragmenting. The United States is, in effect, moving toward a world in which it faces more connected opponents with a less cohesive coalition of its own. This is a major shift with profound implications for U.S. national security—and it’s one that the Trump administration shows no sign of recognizing, let alone reversing.
The post A New Geopolitical Reality Is Here appeared first on The Atlantic.
