After more than three weeks of open warfare, Iran effectively controls the Persian Gulf. The country’s two-pronged attack against gulf commercial shipping and critical infrastructure has cut off roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas supplies, leaving only Iranian oil to make it out.
President Trump last week responded by removing sanctions from some of the oil flowing out of Iran, in an effort to ease high petroleum prices. If the money from selling that oil gets back to Tehran, the president’s move will be deeply counterproductive. Instead, he should order a blockade of Iranian oil. To negotiate an end to the crisis from a position of strength, the Trump administration should flip the script on Iran, depriving it of revenue unless the regime restores security in the gulf.
The key to securing — or blockading — gulf energy exports is not at the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway that connects the gulf with global markets. Even if the United States fully secures the strait for commercial traffic, Iran will retain the firepower and range to continue striking ships and the facilities that load those ships throughout the region. Securing the strait would impose no pressure on Iran to ease up, because the country would continue exporting oil.
Iran’s Kharg Island, the terminal in the northeastern corner of the gulf from which most Iranian oil exports are loaded, is also an unattractive target for the United States. Focusing on Kharg is understandable, as Iran has managed to continue shipping oil cargoes from its docks during the war nearly on par with prewar volumes. But destroying Kharg’s oil infrastructure to shut down the country’s oil exports would create many years of hardship for the people of Iran, whose long-term interests we ostensibly seek to promote.
A second option is to physically seize Kharg, leaving U.S. personnel with hands on the spigots. This option is better than the destruction of the island’s facilities, because the United States can end a temporary occupation when conditions warrant, preserving Iran’s oil resources for the long term. But it could be costly. U.S. naval forces tasked with inserting and supporting ground combat units would need to transit the strait and operate in the gulf, within range of Iran’s missiles, drones, speedboats and explosive mines. This complex threat environment has deterred naval escorts of commercial ships through the strait. Once they arrive, U.S. forces on Kharg would be vulnerable to fire from mainland Iran. Taking control of Iran’s oil exports is not worth the risk of incurring significant casualties.
The best approach to curbing Iran’s oil exports is to impose a naval blockade of tankers carrying Iranian oil, as Richard Haass, a veteran American diplomat, recently proposed. A similar operation helped Washington easily take control of Venezuela’s oil exports last December with no reported U.S. losses. The cordon could be established in the Arabian Sea, beyond the range of most Iranian weapons systems that have wreaked havoc in and near the gulf, with minimal risk to U.S. personnel.
Cutting off Iran’s oil shipments would strengthen the Treasury Department’s recent move to make Iranian oil at sea, largely untouchable because of sanctions, available on the world market to help alleviate shortages. As with Venezuela, the administration could confiscate Iranian oil shipments and allow commodity trading firms to sell them on the world market, while ensuring that sales proceeds don’t reach the regime in Tehran.
The American naval force supporting Operation Epic Fury was designed to fight a war, not to enforce a blockade — but it could quickly pivot. The dozen-plus naval destroyers in the area could begin tracking and intercepting Iranian oil tankers within days of getting such an order, although some would need to hand off other important missions, such as fleet defense and offensive strikes. The Navy would also need to prepare boarding parties and plan to pursue ships trying to evade its cordon, as U.S. Coast Guard cutters did in the Venezuela operation. In that effort, the tanker Marinera fled the blockade all the way to waters near Iceland, but the long arm of the United States caught up with it. That combination of steely resolve and global reach is itself a powerful deterrent — one that would likely keep many Iranian tankers in port.
A blockade on outbound oil tankers doesn’t guarantee that Iran will call off its gulf siege. Difficult negotiations and significant concessions will be required to restore regional security, and a mutually acceptable arrangement will not be the “unconditional surrender” that Mr. Trump has touted as a U.S. war aim. But by smartly exploiting Iran’s own vulnerability to energy disruptions, the United States and its allies will be in a stronger position to pursue a badly needed offramp from this crisis.
Clayton Seigle is senior fellow and James R. Schlesinger chair in energy and geopolitics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
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