The fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, for now, runs parallel to the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. But Lebanon will become a main arena when the campaign against Tehran ends.
Israel began planning its operation in Lebanon months ago when it became apparent that, since the November 2024 cease-fire, Hezbollah had not depleted its rocket and missile arsenal, rebuilt its command structure and restored its ability to fight, and that, despite promises, the Lebanese government had not fully disarmed the terrorist group. On March 2, after Hezbollah joined the Iranian counterattack and fired at the Galilee, Israel seized the opportunity to go on the offensive.
It’s widely agreed that action against Hezbollah — an internationally recognized terrorist group and a Shiite Muslim political party in Lebanon’s multisectarian society — is necessary. However, a prolonged Israeli military operation, the destruction of state infrastructure and a wider presence in Southern Lebanon, as Israeli officials now propose, could further undermine weak Lebanese institutions, turn its people against Israel and further entrench Hezbollah’s resistance narrative. That’s precisely the opposite of what Israel and the region need.
Washington now has an opportunity to save Israel from itself and create a clear distinction: Fight Hezbollah, yes; punish all of Lebanon in doing so, no. The Trump administration should rein in Israel’s military operation, make serious efforts at bolstering the Lebanese state and military so that they can crack down on Hezbollah and broker a security arrangement that could even lead to peace.
Israel’s interventions in Lebanon, dating back to 1978, have been recurrent and costly. The 1982 invasion, intended to oust the Palestine Liberation Organization, became a nearly two-decade occupation and guerrilla war that helped catalyze Hezbollah’s rise. In late 2024, after months of exchanging rockets with Hezbollah tied to the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack, Israel mounted a campaign of targeted strikes on the Hezbollah command, weapons systems and caches, logistics and finance nodes and seized five hilltops inside Lebanon while widening a buffer zone to protect the residents of the Galilee, who were evacuated after the Oct. 7 assault.
This month’s escalation prompted an Israeli aerial bombardment that has left more than 960 Lebanese dead and led to the flight of more than a million people. Hezbollah has fired at least 1,000 rockets and drones, and at least two Israeli soldiers were killed in combat in Southern Lebanon. The campaign has now expanded into a ground operation in Southern Lebanon, with the capture of additional positions and expansion of a buffer zone north of the border.
Israel’s latest decision to go on the offensive against Hezbollah rests on a bleak assessment of Lebanon’s ability to control its own territory. The Lebanese government approved a plan to disarm Hezbollah more than six months ago. According to the U.S. Central Command, the Lebanese Armed Forces removed nearly 10,000 rockets and almost 400 missiles by the end of October. The Lebanese Army also retook control of the Beirut airport, believed to be a key node in a smuggling network run by Hezbollah.
The Israeli campaign, however necessary it might be, is not enough to fully disarm Hezbollah. New leaders can quickly take the place of those who have been killed. Arsenals can be rebuilt. Relying solely on the weak Lebanese Army won’t work either. Lebanon’s government needs to step up — and gain backing from the United States and Israel — to reduce Hezbollah’s political role and further distance its narrowing support base among many Lebanese Shiites.
Israeli overreach in the campaign and failure to frame the fight as a war on Hezbollah but not on the state of Lebanon risks squandering a rare diplomatic opening.
On March 9, President Joseph Aoun of Lebanon accused Hezbollah of working toward the “collapse” of the state and proposed a plan that includes international logistical support for the Lebanese Army, an immediate effort to dismantle Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles and direct talks with Israel. Israel has not responded publicly, but unnamed sources said on Sunday that the two countries were expected to hold talks.
Israeli officials dismissed the Lebanese call for talks as no more than an attempt to reach an immediate cease-fire. But they overlook steps taken by the Lebanese government to outlaw Hezbollah’s activities and the arrests of militants for having illegal arms. They also ignored a broader and rare softening of anti-Israel oratory in the past few months and far wider support for disarming Hezbollah. Political leaders of different sects have voted in favor of banning Hezbollah’s military activities and some have even called for peace with Israel. Lebanese media outlets now feature formerly outlawed ideas, including direct engagement with Israel.
In Israel, hard-line members of the governing coalition warn that Lebanon will suffer devastation. Energy and Infrastructure Minister Eli Cohen said on Sunday that Israel is considering canceling a 2022 maritime border agreement with Lebanon. Such declarations are read in Beirut not as partisan words, but as strategic directives. That perception matters. While the vast majority of Lebanese support disarming Hezbollah, they find it hard to believe that Israel’s territorial ambitions are any more temporary than they’ve proven to be in Gaza, the West Bank and even Syria over the past two and a half years.
Here lies the opening for Washington to lead diplomatically. Talks in themselves would not reassure either side unless they deliver concrete security and political dividends. The United States should publicly guarantee — and induce Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to publicly promise — that Israeli military advances are not permanent land grabs, but instead are part of a road map toward normalization.
The United States and its partners should also demand that the Lebanese government outlaw Hezbollah’s economic activities, ban its ministers from the cabinet and limit the participation of some of its candidates in the May elections. Paired with a comprehensive strategy to professionalize the army, such political commitment would also put the Lebanese military in a better position to completely disarm Hezbollah and deploy to Hezbollah-dominated areas after Israel withdraws, and prepare those areas for reconstruction.
Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah is understandable. After Oct. 7, the country cannot ignore an armed adversary willing to strike its towns. But relying only on brute force and an expanded buffer in Southern Lebanon is at best a short-term answer. A prolonged Israeli presence in Lebanon will generate friction, cost lives and feed the very narrative of resistance that Hezbollah exploits. This moment offers a rare chance to target a militia without making war on the Lebanese people or state. The strategic aim must be peace with Beirut, not a perpetual Lebanese front.
Shira Efron is the distinguished Israel policy chair and a senior fellow at RAND.
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