Somewhere in the mountains of Iran lies a hidden stockpile that is poised to define the future of America’s war against the theocratic regime: 18 to 20 scuba-tank-like canisters, each of which contains up to 55 pounds of highly enriched uranium, the main material for making a nuclear weapon.
Iran spent decades and billions of dollars amassing that material, prompting Democratic and Republican presidents alike to insist America would do whatever was necessary to prevent Iran from getting a bomb. Iran’s nuclear program has been severely damaged by U.S.-led air attacks over the past nine months. American officials and experts at the International Atomic Energy Agency believe the uranium has nonetheless survived.
The latest conflict, deliberately or otherwise, has forced the uranium issue to the fore, setting off a showdown over Iran’s nuclear future and a scramble to secure its components. If President Trump ends the war without getting control of the canisters, Iran will almost certainly speed toward going nuclear. Grabbing it, on the other hand, would entail huge risk and the inevitable deployment of American or Israeli ground forces.
“They have to deal with this,” said David Albright, the dean of Iran nuclear analysts and founder of the Institute for Science and International Security, a think tank. The stockpile gives whoever emerges in power after the war “a residual nuclear weapons capability,” he said.
That leaves no good options for a very urgent problem. The United States and Israel could dispatch special forces teams, with nuclear experts embedded in them, in the hope of finding, securing and removing or destroying the canisters, perhaps with the help of local insurgents. There have been few attempts to secure a nuclear program in the middle of a war, and it doesn’t take much imagination to see how things could go terribly wrong.
The other approach is diplomatic. Weeks of bombing might force Iran to surrender its enriched uranium and other elements of its program. Intermediaries from Oman suggested recently that Iran might be willing to go this route, but that was before the latest attacks began. This is also not a new idea. One way or the other, America and Iran have been negotiating over this question for more than a decade.
The United States and Israel believe most of the highly enriched uranium is in a tunnel complex outside the city of Isfahan, which has not been the target of major bombing attacks during this campaign. “We’re always highly focused on” the uranium, the under secretary of defense for policy, Elbridge Colby, said at the Council on Foreign Relations on March 4.
After Mr. Trump’s decapitation of much of Iran’s leadership, the security of the stockpile is at risk. Converting the highly toxic material in the canisters into the metal for a weapon is probably beyond the abilities of terrorists, but rogue forces might view it as a decent insurance policy amid the chaos of war. The regime might try to disperse the canisters around the country for safekeeping. Iran has retained other parts of its nuclear program despite the relentless air attacks, and no matter what, the scientific knowledge underpinning the effort can’t be bombed away.
Mr. Trump’s war against Iran has triggered the most consequential nuclear moment in the Middle East in a generation. It’s no exaggeration to say the future of the region may well depend on whether the United States, having triggered the crisis, is successful in finding and securing the stockpile. Representative Bill Foster, Democrat of Illinois, who attended a classified briefing with administration officials on Tuesday, said Iran does “not need to enrich further to make a usable nuclear weapon. It’s true that what they have can’t be launched atop a missile, but unfortunately there’s different ways to deliver such a weapon.”
The confrontation over Iran’s enriched uranium has been building for years. Unlike in Iraq two and a half decades ago, when American intelligence agencies incorrectly argued that the country had a secret nuclear program, there is no doubt about Iran’s nuclear stockpile, which has been independently verified by the I.A.E.A. The organization significantly ramped up monitoring of the country’s nuclear program in 2003.
Under the 2015 nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration, Iran agreed to limit the enrichment of its uranium to less than 4 percent purity until 2030 in exchange for sanctions relief. The agreement was significant because it lengthened the breakout time it would take for Iran to produce a nuclear weapon to more than a year. Mr. Trump abandoned the deal in 2018, and within years, the Iranians began enriching their uranium beyond 20 percent, well higher than could be justified for civilian or scientific use, the I.A.E.A. reported. By the time the United States started its attacks last June, which were designed to debilitate Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iran had amassed an estimated 970 pounds of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity.
That brought Iran within days of producing the 90 percent uranium necessary to fuel devastating nuclear weapons. Even 60 percent enriched uranium, when converted to metal, can be used for a crude weapon with roughly the explosive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Shortly after Mr. Trump’s June attack, Iran kicked the I.A.E.A. inspectors out of the country, and the agency’s head, Rafael Grossi, has said he can no longer say for sure where the enriched uranium is. He assumed it remains at Isfahan, but he said at a March 2 news conference that “we hope it has not been removed.”
Knowing where to find the material is just the first challenge. Mr. Foster said after the classified briefing on Tuesday that the administration did not answer whether it had a strategy for dealing with the problem when it started the war. “We did not hear any plan from the administration to seize it, destroy it or make it subject to international inspection,” he told The Times.
The United States and Israel have the capability to secure Iran’s nuclear materials; this is one scenario in which there could be boots on the ground. Elite commando units among America’s special forces train to conduct high-risk operations to detect, seize and neutralize chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear threats. The United States maintains a system, called the Mobile Uranium Facility, that allows American scientists to quickly characterize, stabilize and package uranium. It’s made up of several shipping containers that can be loaded aboard military cargo planes and sent anywhere in the world from its current location in Tennessee at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Israeli special operations forces units have been training toward a mission to seize Iran’s nuclear material for more than a decade, according to several former U.S. government officials. Israel’s ability to conduct such raids came into public view in September 2024 when commandos stormed a Hezbollah facility in Syria, rappelling from helicopters to get to rooms that were buried deep in a mountainside. “Putting troops on the ground to remove this material is an option,” said Richard Nephew, an Iran nuclear expert who served in the Obama and Biden administrations. “But it’s highly risky.”
Securing the nuclear stockpile after the bombs stop falling would be much easier. The United States and the United Nations have experience in such operations. Even then, it would be a daunting challenge to account for Iran’s nuclear material in all its forms, as well as whatever remains of centrifuges and related equipment involved in the program. “The list of objectives gets long fairly quickly,” said a former Iraq weapons inspector, Charles Duelfer.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States devised a disarmament program that stretched across 15 sovereign states, involving 30,000 nuclear weapons and an estimated 40,000 tons of chemical weapons. The lesson there was that securing the nuclear material was only the start. It will be important to have a full accounting for the machinery, technicians and scientists involved to prevent problems popping up elsewhere. “What we don’t want is a post-Soviet Union environment where people with nuclear expertise are in the wind,” said Corey Hinderstein, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s deputy administrator for nonproliferation in the Biden administration.
The biggest obstacle to the peacetime approach — beyond the fact that the United States and Israel continue to attack Iran around the clock — is the Iranian regime itself. Mr. Trump launched the war amid negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. That would make talks based on trust hard to restart. And after years of on-again, off-again diplomacy and enormous military attacks, Iran’s leaders might well have concluded that their only true guarantee for staying in power is to acquire a nuclear weapon as soon as possible.
There is a third possibility, of course. The war could end with Iran’s nuclear capabilities intact. That outcome looks even less appealing now than it did over the past few decades, in which one American president after another swore to prevent it. The regime’s track record of targeting the United States and its allies around the world would only get worse with the protection a nuclear arsenal would provide.
In a war filled with open questions, the fate of the Iranian uranium canisters is a terribly concrete determinant of what the future holds. The nuclear question is likely to be the most consequential one, however it is solved. That may be the most reckless part of Mr. Trump’s attack on Iran: forcing a final resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue with no clear path to success.
Massimo Calabresi is an Opinion editor at large.
This Times Opinion essay is funded through philanthropic support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Outrider Foundation and the Prospect Hill Foundation. Funders have no control over the selection or focus of articles or the editing process and do not review articles before publication. The Times retains full editorial control.
Source photographs by Brendan Smialowski/Getty Images and Wana News Agency, via Reuters
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