What exactly is President Trump’s foreign policy, and how does the Iran war fit into it? Trump 2.0 has offered a challenge for those who have embraced “America first.” In Washington, most Republicans have lined up behind the president.
But there are voices on the right — critical of the war and of the Trump administration’s use of the military more generally — who still seek a foreign policy of restraint.
Michael Brendan Dougherty, a senior writer at National Review, is one such person questioning the absence of restraint and the objectives of the attack on Iran. To explain why, he had a written conversation with John Guida, an editor in Times Opinion.
John Guida: It’s been several days since the attack on Iran began. When the war started, you wrote (in “A War Without the People”), “Our foreign policy class wants to conduct the nation’s military and diplomatic posture in a place beyond the reach of public opinion.” The Trump administration has offered an ambiguous case to the American people. Do you have a sense of why the administration is doing this — and what its goals are?
Michael Brendan Dougherty: The very clearest explanation came from Elbridge Colby, the under secretary of defense (policy), in a public forum in which he said that the objective given to the military was to degrade Iran’s nuclear program and its conventional weapons and to attack its ability to field, and construct, missiles. This seems to be consistent with certain statements from Secretary of State Marco Rubio that the primary concern was to disrupt Iran’s ability to strike at Americans on our bases and to degrade their ability to retaliate against other allies.
However, it does seem to introduce some daylight between our objectives and Israel’s, which seem to be focused on degrading the Iranian regime itself. President Trump in his initial statement encouraged the Iranian people to rise up, presumably to overthrow the current regime. But even as he stokes the desire for regime change in some constituencies, other administration statements seem to deny that this is our intention.
Guida: Do you see the mixed messages as a problem for the conventional democratic deliberation ahead of such an expansive military action?
Dougherty: Personally, as someone trying to make judgments about whether the means we are deploying match the ends we are seeking, yes, I would prefer more clarity. But I accept now, this deep into Trump’s second term, that sometimes Trump delivers multiple messages that will find acceptance among different audiences, and that he prefers to take dramatic action, and only then begins to evaluate the options it yields. As on the trade war, he doesn’t limit himself to one end state and drive policy relentlessly in that direction. Rather, he seems to destroy what he sees as a bad status quo, and then opportunistically looks for the best outcome available.
Guida: One criticism of that approach is that it inhibits preparation for various outcomes — that without a conventional process in place, as in previous administrations, the options cannot be weighed and various outcomes planned for. Is that a concern?
Dougherty: Yes, very much so. A good example from the first term was when Trump, after Turkish President Recep Erdogan asked in a phone call why U.S. troops were still in Syria in 2018, announced a withdrawal of troops from that country, reportedly overruling the advice of his generals and civilian advisers. It made the news, but it never got buy-in, and then quietly some time later “the White House” announced that the troops were staying after all. This creates huge uncertainty for our friends and allies. And I think that’s relevant to Iran policy today. Europe is now swallowing massive energy inflation, on top of our tariffs and their lowered trade barriers.
Guida: You mentioned that Trump delivers multiple messages, which could be seen as a way of managing his coalition. In this case, his action seems to have alienated a critical bloc — the America-first group, people like Marjorie Taylor Greene. They could quote, for example, Charlie Kirk, who said in June 2025 that a regime change operation against Iran would be “pathologically insane.” Do you see the Iran attack as a betrayal of America-first ideals?
Dougherty: It should not be seen as a betrayal, but a disappointment, for sure. Trump had always vowed he would not let Iran get a nuclear weapon and threatened to use military action to make good on that promise. Figures like Pat Buchanan, who raised the America-first banner beforehand, had supported President Barack Obama’s Iran deal. Trump did not. But Trump very much in his campaign literature, in his choice of appointments, from Tulsi Gabbard as the director of national intelligence to JD Vance as the vice president, signaled that he remained against open-ended forever wars in the Middle East.
If he can keep U.S. casualties and commitments limited in Iran, his coalition will take it. But every few days we hear of a potential doubling — from four weeks to eight weeks. Politico reports the Pentagon is planning on operations that could last through September. If that happens, gas prices go up, and the energy politics in Europe drive that continent up a wall, then more and more of his people will turn to Tucker Carlson and Megyn Kelly.
Guida: Any idea where this decision originated from in the administration? With the Venezuela action, people attribute that to Marco Rubio. This one seems more of a mystery, or if there is attribution, it’s often credited to the persuasion efforts of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Dougherty: It was damaging of Marco Rubio and others to say, even if they believed that this conflict was inevitable, that the timing of the decision was driven by Israel. When others are arguing that it’s a 47-year war, the question of “why now” is little different than the question of “why.” I personally would not underestimate the influence of Saudi Arabia. Nor the simple combination of Iran’s own slightly delusional intransigence, and Trump’s impatience with diplomacy.
Guida: There may be talk of a fissure on the right, but there is very little sight of it in the Senate. On Wednesday, the Senate voted on a proposal that would have limited President Trump’s power to continue waging war against Iran without congressional authorization. It was blocked by all Republicans but one — Rand Paul. Is that more evidence of the disconnect you’ve previously identified between Republicans in Washington and the electorate?
Dougherty: Yes, it’s very much true that in Washington, debating regime change in Iran is as common as debating whether to order Chipotle for lunch. Our political class confuses their environment — thick with think-tankers and foreign policy professionals — with deliberation among the people themselves.
But it’s also a reflection of the misleading unity among G.O.P. elected officials. Underneath that unity is a divide. The older senators, following Mitch McConnell, are Iran hawks in their bones. Many of them opposed certain foreign policy appointments in the administration, fearing even to give a foothold to the restrainers or prioritizers, whom they deem isolationists. Some of the younger G.O.P. senators may be America first in their heart of hearts, but before that, they are loyal to their leader, President Trump.
Guida: One of your consistent criticisms of American foreign policy in recent years is the divergence between action and resources. For example, you’ve opposed some aid to Ukraine because you don’t feel the United States has been clear in how to manage its resources with the costs of expansive, idealistic foreign policy commitments. That was one of the key values of America first.
But in the Senate vote on Wednesday, and generally in Trump 2.0, we don’t see a lot of hard evidence for that. Do you see it anywhere?
Dougherty: Ultimately, American power rests on an equation. Do your resources and willpower match your commitments? Our foreign policy class has desperately wanted to make a binding commitment to Ukraine. But Americans have never depended on Ukraine for their prosperity or security. And so, even though a vast majority of Americans polled support Ukraine and feel Russia to be the transgressor, even at the start of the war, 77 percent of Americans said they did not want to play a “major role” in the war. I knew then and there that Russia would most likely commit more to achieve its ends in Ukraine. We truly live in a democracy, and our people do, in the end, impose limits on what the foreign policy court around the president can achieve.
Guida: In February the Congressional Budget Office released a new “economic outlook.” Even if the precise projection is contested, as they usually are, the picture it paints is of our government facing staggering piles of debt. A Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget article noted that “the federal government spends more on interest than on Medicaid, national defense or total nondefense discretionary spending.” Is this another limit that at some point this or a future administration — or Congress — will have to contend with?
Dougherty: Yes, of course. I think much of the administration’s economic and foreign policy has been about trying to manage to keep as much of the extraordinary privilege of being the world’s reserve currency as possible, while simultaneously trying to manage the downside risk it brings. If an adversary can start a sell-off of dollars, we could find ourselves in trouble quickly. Ultimately, the British Empire was a winner in both world wars. And yet, those wars put it in hock to America. They went broke. Our fiscal capacity is one of those resources in the equation of American power.
Guida: Presidents know that military action is not inexpensive, and yet they have all used it, usually at a minimum via air power. Whether it’s debt or something else, do you see a mechanism for restraint? You mentioned public opinion. Congress has the power of the purse, but it still seems unlikely that a future Congress would impose steep cuts on our military.
Dougherty: You are right about the pattern at work, vows of peace before warfaring administrations. But I do see the restraints somewhat at work. They were temporarily set loose after 9/11. But Bill Clinton did not want troops on the ground after the disaster in Somalia. Obama looked at public opinion and did not go all the way in Syria.
Even now, Trump is allowing administration officials to reassure the public there will be limits. But for now, Congress has officially given the advantage to the executive power, and there is a huge foreign policy court in Washington filled with people who think they can make something good happen in the world, if only America would lend its military might to the cause. That almost missionary or millenarian impulse found throughout that foreign policy court is deeply embedded in us by our Christian civilization, even as it has become unmoored from the restraints of official doctrine or orthodoxy.
Guida: We have often tried to make sense of foreign policy through the lens of Walter Russell Mead’s presidential typology (which, to be clear, in his words, is meant to be “suggestive and evocative,” not definitive). They are divided into four camps: Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian and Wilsonian ideals.
Hamiltonians: business-minded internationalists, cold-eyed and stability-oriented and wary of wars that seem idealistic rather than self-interested. Wilsonians: idealists, neoconservative or liberal interventionist, who see the U.S. military as a force for spreading democracy and liberal ideals. Jeffersonians: a “come home, America” retreat from empire that sees America’s wars as mostly unwise and unjust. Finally, Jacksonians: a feisty nationalism, wary of international entanglements but ready for war whenever threats arise.
Most presidents fell into the Hamiltonian or Jeffersonian camp. But I think it’s fair to say that Trump has been most often called a Jacksonian. How would you think about Trump 2.0 within this framework? And what would the ideal Michael Brendan Dougherty version be?
Dougherty: I think the balance of power in our democracy has always been with the Jacksonians who are volcanic. They appear to be dormant Jeffersonians in times of peace, but then are prepared to launch terrible righteous war upon the enemy of America as if they were enemies of the Lord. Michael Doran has correctly located this voice and spirit in the prose of Melville.
My ideal country would be one populated with many Jacksonians, but a leadership class that was a mix of Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians, exercising prudent restraint on the public’s sometimes tempestuous passions. The Jeffersonians guard the character of the nation itself, and its internal liberty, which can be wounded in war. The Hamiltonians keep America from becoming a beggar and a debtor. But then that’s the way conservatives have always flattered themselves.
Michael Brendan Dougherty, a senior writer at National Review, is the author of “My Father Left Me Ireland: An American Son’s Search for Home.” John Guida is a Times Opinion editor.
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: [email protected].
Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Bluesky, WhatsApp and Threads.
The post An America First Conservative Wrestles With Trump’s War appeared first on New York Times.
