As U.S. and Iranian negotiators prepare for more talks in Geneva, the White House is reportedly considering an initial, targeted military strike — with the possibility of broader action if Tehran refuses to accept demands for “zero enrichment” of nuclear material. In his State of the Union address Tuesday, President Trump argued that last year’s U.S. strikes had “obliterated” Iran’s program even as his administration continues negotiations now, without a clear objective.
The strategic logic appears straightforward: strike first, demonstrate resolve, increase pressure and force Iran back to the table on American terms.
Before momentum carries the country further down that path, the nation is owed clear answers. Decisions of this kind should not rest solely on tactical calculation; they require clarity about legal authority, strategic reality and risk.
Presidents may act unilaterally to protect the United States or its allies from imminent harm, but the Constitution assigns Congress the power to actually declare war. While formal declarations have fallen out of practice, Congress has authorized the use of military force when sustained hostilities were anticipated.
Military force used to gain leverage in negotiations is different from self-defense. It is an effort to force another government to change its behavior. Absent an imminent attack, decisions of this magnitude require collective deliberation of the people’s representatives, not unilateral action.
Even if the administration pursued a lawful path forward, the strategy deserves scrutiny. Compelling an adversary to reverse course under visible military threat is rarely linear. It would require Iran’s leaders to yield publicly, absorb domestic backlash and trust that U.S. restraint will follow their compliance. That is a high bar in any political system. It is especially high in one built around resistance to external pressure.
Once strikes begin, the political landscape changes. Leaders facing external attack tend to consolidate authority, security institutions gain influence and nationalist sentiment rises. Internal debate narrows, and positions that might once have been negotiable can harden when framed as capitulation under fire. In that environment, pressure does not reliably produce moderation. It could just as easily produce entrenchment.
If broader military action remains openly on the table — and if objectives extend to weakening the regime — the boundary between limited coercion and open-ended conflict becomes less clear. What is imagined as calibrated pressure in Washington could easily be perceived as an existential threat in Tehran. Escalation through force is not a one-sided endeavor, and adversaries under external pressure do not always respond in predictable ways.
There is also a question of scale. Operations against Iran would not resemble recent limited strikes against weaker or more isolated targets. Iran possesses geographic depth, layered air defenses, a significant missile arsenal and proxy relationships with armed groups operating across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. U.S. bases, allied cities and major shipping lanes all sit within reach of that network.
This is not a sparse battlefield. It is a dense and interconnected one. Potential retaliation may not mirror the initial U.S. strikes. It could unfold across multiple theaters and over extended periods, in ways designed to impose cost without offering clear offramps. The margin for miscalculation would be thin.
The recent success of limited U.S. military operations has shaped expectations. The absence of catastrophe has fostered the belief that escalation can be managed. Confidence formed in lower-risk environments such as Nigeria or Venezuela may not translate to this one.
None of this is an argument against preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Keeping such capabilities out of unstable hands is a legitimate national interest. Protecting American interests and allies is a serious responsibility. But seriousness of purpose requires seriousness of process. The American public has been offered no opportunity to authorize this effort and no clear articulation of the political end state once force is employed.
What has been presented instead is the assumption that military pressure will shape political outcomes in our favor. Airstrikes can impose costs; they cannot dictate how an adversary consolidates power under attack or how retaliation unfolds across a region. Initiating hostilities against Iran would begin a conflict with a capable state whose response we do not fully control. It would rest on the belief that pressure can be calibrated and escalation managed.
The United States possesses extraordinary military capability. Yet military power is not the same as political control. It can destroy targets, but it cannot determine how an adversary recalculates its chances of regime survival. When it becomes the default instrument for solving political problems — applied without clear authorization and defined political objectives — we risk mistaking action for strategy. Against a state with Iran’s reach and capacity, that is no small gamble.
Jon Duffy is a retired naval officer. He writes about leadership and democracy.
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