Mark A. Fowler is a retired CIA case officer and Iran specialist.
In this fraught moment, Washington needs to execute an Iran strategy that recognizes a simple truth: Lasting change will only come from Iranians themselves.
Iran is approaching a breaking point. For the first time in decades, the clerical regime is truly vulnerable. The most recent nationwide protests have been suppressed, but over the last several days, we have seen Iran’s universities, historically hotbeds of discontent, leading the way in what may become the resurgence of open resistance.
Decades of corruption, economic mismanagement, environmental degradation and growing demographic pressures have produced a society that no longer believes the clerical regime is capable of governing.
In recognition of this, Washington should step back from leading with military strikes on nuclear facilities to force Iran’s leaders into a deal they have no intention of honoring in the long term. Quick, dramatic strikes against regime nuclear facilities may feel decisive and satisfying, but they are just a short-term fix, likely to backfire by unifying the regime’s factions and to alienate the populace by appearing irrelevant to their struggle.
What is needed most in this moment is the empowerment of the foot soldiers of any effort to change the government. Washington should opt for steady, visible pressure that gives Iran’s restive domestic opposition not only hope, but space to breathe, organize and coalesce under effective internal leadership. This may take less time than expected once the U.S. commitment to supporting popular resistance becomes clear.
Key to this effort will be facilitating communication between fledgling opposition groups and leaders, allowing them to coordinate their actions and garner support. Many of these individuals and groups will be unknowns, unvetted — and some will most certainly be agents of the regime attempting to identify and disrupt the opposition. U.S. and allied intelligence organizations need to overload those groups’ capabilities and divide the attention of regime security forces.
Modern digital communications are fast, reliable and trackable, inevitably, absent a high level of technical skill, leaving digital footprints behind. And when they are internet-based, as many are, they are subject to disruption. The answer is not only to flood the zone, pushing multiple capabilities into Iran, including internet-based and other high-tech options, but to go low-tech. One example is one-way voice link, or OWVL, a Cold War-era method that requires only minimal equipment and basic training and provides an unbreakable method for communicating through the use of one-time pads.
Such methods are not sensitive CIA capabilities and can be provided to unvetted groups. Though many are known to Iranian security organizations, they require intensive resources to track. Moreover, Iran’s youth are highly technically literate — when motivated to fight back, they are certain to find their own way to break through the regime’s constraints.
This approach is likely to spread security forces too thin to effectively track the activities of a growing internal opposition using a variety of communication techniques.
Another important effort would entail outreach to senior regime military and security commanders with offers of a way out; essentially urging them to defect in place. This can be done in a number of ways, including calls to their — or a close relative’s — personal mobile phone, text messages that include an encrypted link to contact the CIA, or emails, etc.
Most would be rejected out of hand and reported but some would not. The primary purpose, however, would be to fracture the regime’s trust in its own people, making it unsure of who had been contacted, who had reported the contact and who had not. And worst of all, who had accepted the offer.
In conjunction with these covert intelligence operations, overt U.S. military force would signal to the Iranian people that the U.S. supports their efforts to free themselves, encouraging the opposition to reengage with the explicit understanding that it has the backing of the U.S. government.
How the U.S. employs force, however, will be key. Nuclear facilities are a long-term threat and need not be targeted to bring down the regime. And even if destroyed, the current regime can rebuild them. Offensive missile emplacements are valid targets, as are small boat fleets and naval assets in the key ports of Bandar Abbas and Bushehr, as well as Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil export facility.
But the most effective use of American force would be against internal security forces. These should include the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij communications and logistics hubs, transportation and fuel facilities, armories and command-and-control centers. primarily in Tehran and larger cities initially, then spreading out within the country as protests emerge. This would not simply weaken the regime’s ability to respond to internal incidents, it would be a visible morale boost to Iranians, encouraging others to join the opposition.
Once the clerical leadership falls or steps aside, the IRGC will certainly attempt to seize control. Washington must be clear: Any transition must include replacement of senior leadership and placing all military and security forces under the authority of a representative civilian government.
The Iranian people have shown extraordinary courage, risking their lives time and again. The U.S. cannot manufacture a revolution, nor should it try to. But it can help ensure that when the revolution comes, it leads to a stable representative government rather than more of the same.
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