Recent Western failures and mistakes have enhanced Russia’s chances of prevailing in its unprovoked aggression against Ukraine. Moreover, not just Ukrainian independence and freedom are at stake. During the Cold War, sundering the North Atlantic alliance was a critical Soviet objective, which fortunately never happened. Now, however, many Americans and Europeans seem intent on doing Moscow’s work.
Proving yet again that the European Union is less than the sum of its parts, an E.U. summit last week failed to agree on using approximately 210 billion euros of frozen Russian state assets as collateral for a “reparations” loan to Ukraine. Belgium, which holds most of the frozen funds, felt inadequately protected against the risks of Moscow later seeking to retrieve its assets. Taking advantage of inherent structural flaws in E.U. decision-making procedures, Belgium, backed quietly by several others, blocked the plan. Instead, the E.U. authorized a 90 billion euro loan on its own account. Even then, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic declined to participate.
The Trump administration reportedly tried to derail the Europeans’ plan in order to deploy the same assets in President Donald Trump’s own peace plan. American concerns with using Russian state assets range from U.S. nationals being subjected to similar seizures elsewhere to countries diversifying away from the U.S. financial system. Either would incur greater long-term risks than any near-term benefits from using Moscow’s assets. But regardless of whether the original E.U. plan was viable, Trump’s intervention and the E.U.’s failure furthered Western disunity.
Concerted E.U. rhetoric to sugarcoat the outcome cannot conceal this collective failure. The loan approved is less than half what was projected and merely provides budget support for Kyiv over the next two years. The larger resources — to defend and rebuild Ukraine — remain undefined and therefore uncertain. Reserving the option to proceed against Russia’s assets later, as the Europeans are claiming they still can, may save face. But in truth, last week’s summit showed just how unlikely to succeed any future effort will be.
This was failure pure and simple by leaders Vladimir Putin had called little piglets just days before. The E.U. message was weak: Europe will sort of support Ukraine, but not much. No wonder Putin believes time is on his side, especially as polling indicates declining French and German public support for aiding Kyiv, and Europe falling short in replacing declining U.S. assistance.
Even worse emerged from the bilateral U.S.-Russian peace discussions last weekend. Trump has repeatedly said, without evidence, that Putin is anxious to have peace in Ukraine. By contrast, U.S. intelligence reportedly differs sharply from this assessment. Kirill Dmitriev, Russia’s chief negotiator, signaled Moscow’s delight with the E.U.’s financing debacle before traveling to Miami, doubtless eager to see his Kremlin-favored U.S. counterpart, Steve Witkoff, as well as Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law. Trump’s diplomatic dream team clearly doesn’t care about the substance of the deal. It just wants to get one. No U.S. national-security analysis underlies the Witkoff-Kushner effort, only a drive to negotiate something that might bring Trump a Nobel Peace Prize.
Putin was also delighted when he emphasized in his annual year-end news conference that Trump’s new National Security Strategy does not characterize Russia as an adversary. Putin mocked NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte for “preparing for war with us. What is that? Can’t you read?” Unsurprisingly, Putin showed no flexibility in his Ukraine war aims, hardly a good omen for whatever instructions Dmitriev carried with him to Florida.
After two days of talks, Witkoff took to social media on Monday to say his meetings with Dmitriev had been “productive and constructive.” He added, once again echoing Trump, “Russia remains fully committed to achieving peace in Ukraine.” No wonder Moscow enjoys negotiating with Witkoff. It fell to Yuri Ushakov, former Russian ambassador to Washington and Putin’s foreign-policy adviser, to introduce reality, Kremlin style. He remarked that the talks had been “rather unconstructive.”
Spin and hype notwithstanding, Moscow and Kyiv remain far apart. With Trump interested less in U.S., NATO or Ukrainian security interests than his quest for a Nobel, one might expect European leaders to step into the void. That seems unlikely. Leaders of key countries like France, Germany and the U.K. are all in deep domestic political trouble. Moreover, the Ukraine crisis has underlined that the E.U., despite its supranational pretensions, is simply not competent in matters of peace and security.
Can anyone in Europe deal effectively with Trump’s objectively pro-Russian behavior and the E.U.’s self-inflicted incapacity? Rutte may be the best candidate to take the leading role, given his success in dealing with Trump and his deep connections with European NATO members from his days as Dutch Prime Minister. It is not normal for NATO’s political leader to take such a role, but these are not normal times.
Ukraine and the West should hope for a Merry Christmas, because they face a long winter.
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