Derek Scissors is chief economist of the China Beige Book. Zack Cooper is a lecturer in public and international affairs at Princeton University. Both writers are senior fellows at the American Enterprise Institute.
In the roughly 10 months since his return to the White House, President Donald Trump has made many threats against perceived adversaries. He has even followed through on some of them — for example, against Iran. The president has been remarkably generous, though, toward the United States’ most prominent adversary: China. Since April, Trump has repeatedly given ground to the People’s Republic. He did it again last week by agreeing to allow export of the advanced H200 chip to Chinese customers.
Trump’s second-term China policy started out aggressive, with a series of announcements about raising tariffs on Chinese products from 25 percentto 145 percent. By early spring, however, tariffs faded into the background as an issue in U.S.-China trade, because on April 4, China countered with new, stricter export controls on rare-earth materials, including for the first time rare-earth magnets.
Rare earths are valuable to a range of U.S. economic sectors. The auto industry, in particular, warned that without low-cost but indispensable rare-earth magnets, assembly lines might be shut down. This was quite a predictable predicament, as Beijing had long bragged about its rare-earth reserves and used export limits in disputes.
Yet the administration seemed completely unprepared. It embarked on what turned out to be a farcical series of trade meetings. At various points, Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent claimed a deal was possible that would “fully open” the Chinese market to U.S. business or rebalance the trade relationship — claims no longer being made because they were ridiculous from the start.
By early October, it was China taking the initiative, launching a second, broader set of controls on rare-earth exports. Trump responded with more tariff threats, but he also noted that a trade war was not “sustainable,” a far cry from his attitude six months earlier.
In late October, Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met and supposedly crafted a deal. The U.S. immediately cut tariffs somewhat and suspended new export controls and port fees. China made commitments involving resumption of rare-earth exports as well as imports of U.S. soybeans.
Except China’s steps have been only partial. Soybean purchases are slow, and Bessent was forced to admit on Nov. 16 that the rare-earth agreement had not been finalized. In early December, China started to issue rare-earth licenses, but they still come with multiple conditions and overall export volume remains subdued. In the meantime, a long-delayed U.S. inquiry into semiconductor imports seems to have vanished. The Trump administration looks intimidated.
Nor is the near-paralysis limited to trade. The administration is trying so hard to avoid angering Beijing that it is pulling its foreign policy punches as well.
During a Japanese parliament budget hearing on Nov. 7, new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi remarked that a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan could be a “threat to Japan’s survival” — implying Japan might get involved. It was exactly the stance that Trump administration officials in the Pentagon have been pushing Tokyo and other allies to take. Normally, this would be the moment for the American president to reaffirm the U.S.-Japan alliance. Trump did no such thing.
Drawing on its usual coercive playbook, China responded to Japan by stopping most tourism, cutting seafood imports and having a Chinese “diplomat” in Osaka threaten that if Takaichi stuck her neck out, it would be “sliced off.” No White House response followed. It took over a week for the State Department to issue an anodyne, low-level tweet. Only after a Chinese aircraft locked its radar on Japanese jets did the State Department assert it was “unwaveringly committed to our ally Japan.”
On Nov. 24, Trump and Xi spoke by phone. In a brief online post afterward, Trump described it as a “very good” conversation in which the leaders “discussed many topics.” China’s official takeaway was more specific: It said Trump “understands how important the Taiwan question is to China.” Leaders in Asia are increasingly nervous that Trump will try to placate Xi when China has disputes with any U.S. partners, just as he appears to be aligning with Russian President Vladimir Putin over Ukraine.
Much has been made about 2027 being a dangerous year for Taiwan, but 2026 is setting up to be even more problematic. Trump has already agreed to go to China in April and perhaps in November as well. He has offered to host Xi for a state visit and at his Doral resort in Florida next December. This will give Xi and his representatives many opportunities to press Trump for concessions on Taiwan and other issues.
Finally, there is TikTok. Despite much talk about a deal that would divest ByteDance’s share of TikTok, the Trump administration continues to violate U.S. law by allowing it to operate here without a deal in place. Again, Trump has sacrificed leverage and gotten nothing in return.
Combining economic and national security yields perhaps the worst outcome. China has pressured Nvidia to sell advanced semiconductors by rejecting the older technology that the U.S. initially allowed the tech giant to sell. Nvidia, in turn, pushed the White House to greenlight exports of more advanced chips. By permitting H200 exports,the president effectively gave in to Beijing on another vital issue. This year has seen Trump go completely in reverse.
The post America first? Not when Trump is dealing with China. appeared first on Washington Post.
