For four years I was the foreign minister of Lithuania, a country that was once occupied by the Soviet Union and is now a member of NATO and the European Union. Lithuania is on the eastern flank of democratic Europe, between Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The Suwałki Gap, a 40-mile land corridor connecting us with our Polish friends, is regularly cited as the place where President Vladimir Putin of Russia would begin were he to start a war against NATO.
In this neighborhood, a foreign minister understands the importance of deterrence very well. Building alliances and maintaining partnerships with other democracies is not a matter of preference but of survival. We rely on collective defense — the rules of international law and human rights built by earlier generations. And we know that if that system breaks down, we will be among the first victims of its violent replacement.
President Trump is changing those rules. As he re-evaluates old relationships and forms new ones, it’s becoming clear that nothing succeeds with him quite like success. When longtime allies like Europe and NATO make overtures to him citing precedent, shared history or ideals, those appeals do not resonate. But, as Ukraine has shown, the sheen of a winner does appeal to the president. If Europe wants a better relationship with Mr. Trump, it should start acting like a winner.
Early in Mr. Trump’s second term, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine was invited to the White House, roundly scolded and told Ukraine had no cards. In the months that followed, Ukrainians taught the world a master class in how to play the hand they’d been dealt. Ukraine’s army continued to incorporate drones and robotics, made every few yards of the Russian advance on the front line as painful and costly to Russia as possible — in men and in matériel — and, importantly, it started to take the fight to Russia.
In August, a Ukrainian defense company announced that it was moving ahead with production of the Flamingo, a long-range cruise missile with a claimed range of more than 1,800 miles, meaning it could reach deep into Russia. At the end of that month, there were reports that Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian oil refineries had reduced Russian oil production by at least 17 percent; by October, some reduction estimates were as high as 40 percent. The strikes put additional strain on an already struggling Russian war economy and brought the war home to ordinary Russians.
Ukraine’s bold moves might have had another benefit, too: They helped Mr. Trump warm to Ukraine’s cause. After this string of military gains, his tone, when talking about Mr. Putin, started to sound chillier. He was less likely to describe him as “very savvy” and at one point wrote on social media that he was “absolutely CRAZY.”
It’s not as simple as saying that Mr. Trump is now on Ukraine’s side. After repeatedly floating the possibility of selling U.S.-made Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine in October, Mr. Trump demurred following a phone call with Mr. Putin. But, more important, neither is Mr. Trump clearly on Russia’s side. Mr. Putin has remained arrogantly intransigent to Mr. Trump’s proposals for peace while eking out his marginal gains on the front lines at enormous cost. In short, Mr. Putin is behaving like someone who doesn’t realize he is losing. And if nothing else, Mr. Trump is exceptionally wary of looking as if he’s backing a loser.
Europe has spent the year announcing plans. There are plans to rearm, and in some cases (notably Germany) the first real steps toward that aim have been taken. But the full extent of Europe’s cease-fire plan for Ukraine under discussion appears to be to freeze the front line, giving everything east of it to the Russians and making “as long as it takes” sound like a promise made with an asterisk.
MAGA loathes the European Union, which it views as excessively bureaucratic, technocratic and indecisive. Mr. Trump also has made his disdain for the bloc clear; he has said that it was formed to “screw the United States.” Mr. Putin’s recent escalations, including sending drones into European airspace, are likely to be at least partly motivated by making as much of Mr. Trump’s disdain as possible. If there is a weakness in the NATO alliance, then a failure to react to an incursion would be one way to make that weakness apparent to everyone. And if Europe were to react as MAGA expects — with debate and inaction — then these escalations could serve to further weaken NATO in general, and Mr. Trump’s support of it in particular.
Europe, instead, should take a leaf from Ukraine’s book: by ramping up deterrence to levels that actually deter. That means arming ourselves and showing that we are prepared to fight for our values and our land. The permanent deployment of German troops in Lithuania to defend NATO’s eastern flank is a good beginning, as is working with Ukraine to develop a sustainable air defense shield against drone incursions.
By taking action, Europe might find that it can achieve two things: show Mr. Putin that he cannot easily get away with transgressions against Europeans, and remind Mr. Trump why Europe is worth backing.
Gabrielius Landsbergis was the minister of foreign affairs of Lithuania from 2020 to 2024. He is a visiting fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford.
Source photographs by 4×6, hanakaz and Tasos Katopodis, via Getty Images.
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: [email protected].
Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Bluesky, WhatsApp and Threads.
The post Nothing Succeeds With Trump Quite Like Success appeared first on New York Times.
