Wars usually divide people, but Ukraine received overwhelming international sympathy after the full-scale Russian invasion. This was based on several factors. The unprovoked aggression made a moral stance obvious. Historically, too, Ukraine has never invaded or occupied any country. The many layers of the conflict garnered support on multiple fronts: sovereignty and independence; rule of law and human rights; nuclear and environmental threats; democracy against autocracy; and, in the end, the fact that it’s about an underdog stopping a superpower.
Ukraine’s foreign policy has traditionally focused narrowly on European and trans-Atlantic integration. But now that the country’s future depends on financial and military aid, Ukraine has—for the first time in its —had to proactively engage with the rest of the world.
In June, more than 90 countries attended two days of talks in Switzerland at the behest of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky—the so-called High-level Summit for Peace for Ukraine. It was the latest in a series of global meetings organized by Kyiv to rally support. There have been presidential and parliamentary delegation visits (including to Saudi Arabia and Argentina) and invitations for foreign leaders to come to Kyiv (such as the Indonesian president and a delegation of African leaders).
At those meetings, Kyiv has raised a range of issues: sanctions against Russia; providing ammunition (including both new technologies and requests from the states that used to receive aid from the Soviet Union and then Russia); votes in the United Nations; the “Grain from Ukraine” initiative, designed to support shipments to countries in need from Ukrainian agricultural producers; and support on calls for Russia to be held accountable for war crimes.
For more than a year, my organization, the Public Interest Journalism Lab, has been inviting senior editors, intellectuals, and famous media personalities from more than 20 countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America to come to Ukraine. They have visited villages and grain terminals and talked to soldiers and war crime survivors, as well as Zelensky. Through this work, I have gained an insight into how thought leaders from many countries are thinking about this war; that feedback has, in turn, helped inform our evolving national strategy for winning hearts and minds around the world. After the initial full-scale invasion in February 2022, a majority of states supported the U.N. resolution calling for Russia to leave Ukrainian territory, with 141 votes in favor, 7 votes against, and 31 abstentions. We need to keep that broad base of support. Kyiv simply can’t afford for the war to become a globally divisive issue—even as Russia works to make it so.
Starting with the 2014 occupation of Crimea, the Kremlin has invested billions into anti-Ukrainian propaganda aimed at confusing Western audiences. Since its 2022 invasion, Moscow has refocused its tactics onto a divide-and-conquer strategy. With this in mind, Russian state media closed a few offices in the EU and the United States and opened more bureaus and outlets in the global south, including in South Africa, Kenya, and Brazil. To audiences in these countries, Russia portrays its war against Ukraine as a fight with the West, thereby challenging the idea that universal values and rules of law matter.
In combating this propaganda, Ukraine understands that there is no one message or one approach that will work across the world. In 2022, Zelenskyy introduced his “peace formula”—a 10-point plan intended to encourage countries to support the Ukrainian initiatives that they found most applicable to them, including nuclear safety, food security, and the return of prisoners and deported persons. This was intended to pave the way for those who wanted to stay away from direct military support or humanitarian initiatives by providing less contentious options.
At the Switzerland summit this June, the agenda focused on the least controversial initiatives— namely, nuclear energy and nuclear installations, global food security, the release of prisoners of war, and the return of the Ukrainian children deported to Russia—and each was in line with international law, including the U.N. Charter. Though China did not send a representative, and a few countries (such as Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia) did not sign the final communique, the majority of the 90 countries in attendance did. The next meeting may be hosted by Saudi Arabia later this year.
Outreach has become especially urgent given the state of Ukrainian stockpiles. The EU does not have enough capacity to manufacture weapons for itself, and recent debates in the U.S. Congress have shown that Ukraine cannot be that dependent on American supplies. (And that supplies are not, in any case, enough for all the U.S. allies around the world.)
So far, Ukraine has mainly relied on its post-Soviet types of weapons, obtained from the countries that used to receive or buy them from the Soviet Union, Russia, or Ukraine itself. Appropriate ammunition is available in Argentina, Thailand, Brazil, and some African states. Since the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and a few recently added members) won’t provide any weapons to Ukraine, the primary aim is to ensure that they do not help Russia either, as North Korea does. And recently, Ukraine reached out to South Korea and Japan for more advanced ammunition.
After North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited Russia in September 2023, Seoul has been looking not just at what Pyongyang gives to Moscow, but also what it may receive back. The Ukrainian prosecutor’s office has said the rocket that hit the civilian city of Kharkiv—the second-largest Ukrainian city, located 30 kilometers (19 miles) away from the Russian border— on Jan. 2 was of North Korean origin. And the use of at least 21 more North Korean-made ballistic missiles, including three in the city of Kyiv and in the Kyiv region, has now been identified by that office.
Now that Ukraine is focusing on developing its own weapons capabilities, the hope is that the advanced South Korean defense sector may assist with knowledge and technology, even if it does not supply armaments.
Against this backdrop is the potential precedent that Russia’s war in Ukraine sets for China regarding Taiwan. Ukraine is aware that China is probably one of the countries that benefits from the stalemate between Russia and Ukraine: It has opened up access to cheap Russian gas, led to the annihilation of Russian and Western arsenals, and distracted Washington from Pacific power struggles. There may be people in Washington who dislike the idea of Ukraine giving Beijing any greater role in international diplomacy, but Ukraine cannot afford to ignore it—Beijing supplying weapons to Russia is a realistic nightmare for Kyiv.
In answering a question from a Chinese writer at an interview that I had the chance to facilitate, Zelensky noted that Chinese President Xi Jinping is one of the few global leaders to whom Russian President Vladimir Putin will listen to in discussions around avoiding nuclear escalation.
In Africa, Ukraine has opened seven new embassies since 2023, adding to the 10 already operating on the continent. Meanwhile, the Russian diplomatic service inherited a Soviet diplomatic infrastructure that included hundreds of embassies. Though Ukraine did maintain strong trade relations with North Africa following its independence, mainly due to geographic proximity to the Mediterranean Sea, the post-Soviet republics that regained independence amid catastrophic economic crises couldn’t dream of having comparable reach or even a presence anywhere from Tokyo to Delhi, or Nairobi to Kampala.
But though Ukraine will never be able to compete with Russia diplomatically, there is one way in which Ukraine has reached much of the world: food.
Until Russia blockaded Ukrainian ports in February 2022, thereby disrupting a major route for moving agricultural products, Ukrainians themselves didn’t fully comprehend how dependent so much of the world was on their exports. The World Economic Forum estimates that before 2022, Ukraine provided 10 percent of the world’s grains. The country also grows 15 percent of the world’s corn and 13 percent of its barley, alongside sunflower and other staple crops. In 2020, Ukraine was, for instance, the top supplier of wheat and rye to Indonesia; these are the base ingredients for instant noodles, a staple snack for the world’s fourth most populous country.
In July 2022, the United Nations and Turkey brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which eased the Russian blockade. The agreement allowed for a limited number of cargo ships to leave Odesa along a tightly controlled maritime corridor, subject to Russian inspections. Still, the agreement managed to let out more than 1,000 vessels to send at least 32.8 million metric tons of agriculture products.
It was at this point that Ukrainian leadership understood that there was something Ukraine could not just ask for, but offer. Ukraine also partially succeeded in explaining that food prices had climbed not because of the war in Ukraine, but because of the Russian blockade of the Ukrainian ports, and that—despite fighting for its life—the country was doing its best to continue to feed the world.
The Black Sea agreement was unilaterally broken by Moscow in the summer of 2023. Since then, Russian artillery has been constantly targeting Ukrainian agriculture infrastructure and ports. The Ukrainian message to agricultural consumers is that the liberation of the Black Sea and the Ukrainian south is the only way to return to cheaper commodities.
Appealing to concepts of universal justice and human rights is another important avenue for Ukraine to pursue internationally. As Olena Zelenska, the first lady of Ukraine, said at an event that I organized in response to a question from a Nigerian editor, “when we understand that the international system doesn’t work, we must talk not just about ourselves, but about all the other war crimes, humanitarian crises, and tragedies of people around the world.”
The Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine has registered more than 130,000 alleged war crimes committed by Russia. To prosecute senior Russian leaders, the country seeks global support to create an ad hoc Special International Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, which Ukrainian attorneys call “the mother of all crimes.” War crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are currently being investigated by Ukrainian law enforcement, as well as by the International Criminal Court (ICC). National prosecutors, overwhelmed by the scale of atrocities, are willing to pass even the most notorious and memorable cases to be investigated abroad under the principle of universal jurisdiction.
National prosecutors, overwhelmed by the scale of atrocities, are willing to pass even the most notorious and memorable cases to be investigated abroad under the principle of universal jurisdiction.
One example comes from an initiative that I am involved with devoted to war crime documentation, the Reckoning Project. A team from this organization, which includes Ukrainian and international members—including journalists and lawyers of Syrian origin—submitted a criminal complaint to the Argentinian Federal Judiciary in April to investigate torture against a Ukrainian citizen committed during the Russian occupation of Ukraine. (The Argentinian Constitution allows its courts, based on universal jurisdiction, to try international crimes, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, irrespective of where they took place.)
Pragmatists warn that striving to promote human rights issues globally in such ways is naive. But my experience is that it feels the opposite when you talk to those who were oppressed in Iran, Nicaragua, or Syria. Talking to the survivors of war crimes left a powerful impression on correspondents from Asia, Latin America, and Africa who came to Ukraine with various interests and priorities. These conversations were particularly powerful because the journalists were able to relate by sharing stories about their own societies with the Ukrainian survivors.
A Nicaraguan reporter compared the suffering of a schoolteacher from the Kherson region who was held in Russian captivity to the torture that prisoners are subjected to in his native country. A Uruguayan editor wanted to learn how the proper documentation of human rights abuses could enable the delivery of justice in the case of still-ongoing trials of the Uruguayan junta for crimes committed in the 1970s.
With a human rights nongovernmental organization from South Korea, we discussed the possibility of working together on how to broaden the definition of sexual and gender-related violence in international laws, comparing offenses in Ukraine and North Korea. In Abuja, after a screening of a clip from a Reckoning Project film about the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, a Nigerian activist asked me to support her campaign to recover the girls stolen by Boko Haram who still remain in captivity.
During an interview with Asian journalists, Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andrii Kostin himself raised the repeated accusation that Ukraine receives disproportionally more global attention than other global tragedies. “My way to respond is to say that we have the political ability to use any existing global platform which the government can access to investigate, and we are ready to share it,” he said.
Where else, if not here, can justice be served? Given the scale of the properly documented evidence accumulated by local and international media, the presence of investigators, and a relatively functional national law enforcement, what would be the meaning of those conventions if they cannot succeed in prosecutions in this case?
The warrant issued to Putin by the ICC for the deportation of the Ukrainian children in March 2023 was, if not an immediate game-changer, still likely the fastest-ever decision in ICC history. Ukraine wants to prove that even if the international treaties are impotent in preventing atrocities, there should be a more robust global response to prosecute perpetrators, so they do not enjoy full immunity—like the Russian army’s, which enabled it to master its gruesome practices in Chechnya, Georgia, and then in Syria before entering Bucha and Mariupol.
Still, the importance of the so-called rules-based order should not be confused with a framing of the war as a fight between democracy and dictatorship, which risks alienating much of the world.
Tensions must be navigated carefully. For Ukrainian officials, meeting their Taiwanese or Hong Kong counterparts would be impossible—they cannot afford to alienate Beijing. In such cases, Ukrainian civil society, and sometimes the opposition, takes the lead. In the summer of 2024, the major Ukrainian Human Rights Documentary Film Festival partnered with the Taiwan International Documentary Festival. Likewise, Ukrainian human rights defenders stay away from the officials in semi-authoritarian countries, leaving those relations to authorities.
In January 2023, Cambodia—which experienced the Khmer Rouge genocide and is one of the world’s most mined countries—offered to train professionals in Ukraine in humanitarian demining. Ukraine also maintains strong trade relations with Algeria.
Some of these interactions may look symbolic, but they challenge Russian attempts to claim that all not-fully-democratic countries back Moscow by default.
Ukrainians know how offensive it feels to be denied their agency in a situation in which the whole population stood up to invasion by its neighbor and former imperial ruler. But by now, Kyiv is learning not to push nations to choose a side, and not to treat votes in the U.N. as the only criteria for engagement. Members of the Non-Aligned Movement cherish that tradition, which has no connection to their take on a far-away war. It took time for Ukrainians to understand that some continents have not just anti-American, but also anti-European sentiments because of the horrors of colonial history.
After the Israel-Hamas war broke out in Gaza, a group of experts that worked on reaching out to the so-called global south—a term everybody dislikes but has not yet been replaced with a better alternative—gathered in Kyiv to discuss how Ukraine could navigate this newly polarized environment. Support for Israel outside of the United States and Western Europe may be seen as an attempt to please Washington, but Ukraine has its own historic relations with Israel. The Holocaust was partly committed on Ukrainian soil; many Israelis are immigrants from the territory of Ukraine. Hamas is supported by Iran, which also openly backs Moscow. At the same time, there will be other Ukrainians whose sympathy goes to the Palestinian people, whose land—like Ukraine—is occupied.
The ensuing discussion made it more obvious that invoking parallels to every tragedy may be inappropriate and counterproductive for Ukraine. Nonetheless, Ukrainians intuitively feel that their fate is bound to the rest of the globe and a common struggle for a better world. Global solidarity isn’t something that can be demanded; it must instead be inspired.
In the end, Ukraine does not expect foreigners to fight—it is Ukrainians who are paying the highest prices, with their own lives.
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