Nuclear-armed North Korea remains arguably the most dangerous and unpredictable threat to the United States, but the country was not mentioned once in the National Security Strategy released by the White House in December. Where does the Trump administration go from here?
This omission was calculated. President Donald Trump’s first term strategy, released in 2017, stated emphatically that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons “poses a global threat that requires a global response” and committed the U.S. to “compel denuclearization of the peninsula.”
What’s changed — and what the Trump administration seems loath to say out loud — is that denuclearization of the peninsula is no longer an option. North Korea is here to stay as a nuclear power. The best estimates are that Pyongyang has up to 50 assembled nuclear warheads in its stockpile and enough fissile material to produce 40 more.
The International Atomic Energy Agency said in a report last June that North Korea’s nuclear test site at Punggye-ri remains prepared to support a nuclear test on short notice. South Korea’s intelligence agency confirmed that assessment in November.
North Korea has ramped up missile testing in recent weeks and is trying to build a new nuclear-powered submarine. On Jan. 4, dictator Kim Jong Un oversaw the test firing of hypersonic missiles, according to his state media. Kim referred to “the recent geopolitical crisis and various international circumstances.” That was the same weekend U.S. forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in Caracas.
Recognizing North Korea as a permanent member of the nuclear club would mark a seismic, and painful, policy shift. Accepting that reality would open the door for negotiations over limiting the number of warheads and missiles.
Such a shift also carries dangers. South Korea and Japan could look to develop their own nuclear weapons if they don’t feel fully protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
At the same time, Trump might find some common ground with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on North Korea’s proliferation. Beijing, in its own arms control white paper released on November 27, also omitted any reference to China’s longstanding goal of “the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” That aim had been included in previous white papers. Instead, the latest version only mentions working toward “peace, stability, and prosperity on the peninsula.”
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung visited China over four days this month and couldn’t convince Xi to reiterate China’s support for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. But Lee said freezing Pyongyang’s nukes at the current number and halting future ballistic missile tests “would already be a gain.”
The best course is candor. If Washington is ready to shift its posture from denuclearization to “freeze and cap,” it would be helpful to say so plainly, acknowledge the risks and coordinate closely with allies. It should also work to ensure some concessions from North Korea in return. Silence is not sustainable.
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