Foreign policy is likely to feature prominently at the Republican presidential primary debates. At the debate in August, a question on whether the candidates would support continued U.S. assistance to Ukraine produced a firestorm. Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, who had previously suggested that Russia’s war in Ukraine was not a “vital” national interest, appeared skeptical, calling on Europe to do more instead. Entrepreneur Vivek Ramaswamy was more direct in opposing such aid, calling it “disastrous” for the United States to be “protecting against an invasion across somebody else’s border.” Former Vice President Mike Pence and former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, on the other hand, expressed strong support for assisting Ukraine, effectively standing behind President Joe Biden’s efforts to counter Russian aggression while imploring the United States to do even more.
On the other side of the aisle, some Democrats have been wary of Biden’s policy on Ukraine, as evidenced by a letter (that was later retracted) sent to the president by progressive Democrats, calling for a diplomatic end to the conflict and potential sanctions relief for Russia.
In today’s polarized political atmosphere, such cross-cutting views may appear confounding. On most domestic policy issues, whether political leaders have an R or a D next to their name is often a pretty good guide to their take on any particular issue. But when it comes to foreign policy, the normal rules of politics do not apply. Instead, of much greater relevance is where a political leader falls on the foreign-policy ideology spectrum.
The schools of thought that make up this spectrum, reflecting fundamentally different views about the U.S. role in the world, are highly influential but not very well understood.
In seeking to differentiate between foreign-policy positions, the media often resorts to cliches, such as “hawks versus doves,” or buzzwords, such as “isolationist” and “neoconservative.” However, these terms tend to be oversimplified or exaggerated and convey little useful information. International relations theories are not all that helpful either. “Realism” is routinely conflated with an academic concept that predicts how nations can be expected to behave, rather than how they should. And other theories, such as “idealism” and “constructivism,” offer limited utility in understanding real-world decision-making.
Yet there are critical differences in how policymakers view the world and are seeking to influence the direction of U.S. foreign policy. There is a clear dichotomy, for instance, between those who believe that U.S. influence is mostly positive and that the United States should play an active role in global affairs and those who believe that U.S. hubris more often leads to bad outcomes and want to scale back the country’s overseas commitments.
There is a significant divide between those who believe that the United States should prioritize efforts to advance democratic values and norms and those who believe in defending more narrow strategic interests. And there are disparate views on whether the United States should stand firm against adversaries, such as Russia and China, or should seek to find common ground.
I have delineated six distinct foreign-policy camps that represent the dominant strains of thinking on the U.S. role in the world. These camps can be placed along a spectrum of international engagement. Four of them fall on the more assertive side of this spectrum, constituting “internationalists,” who believe that the United States should exercise its influence and be actively engaged in global affairs. And two of the camps are “non-internationalists,” who believe that the United States should scale back its global commitments and adopt a less forward-leaning foreign policy.
THE FOUR INTERNATIONALISTS
THE NON-INTERNATIONALISTS
INTERNATIONALISTS
1. Unilateral Internationalists
Defining worldview: Unilateral internationalists believe U.S. primacy and freedom of action are paramount and prioritize unilateral U.S. action, unconstrained by alliances or international agreements, to advance strategic interests. While President George W. Bush came close, especially during his first term, no U.S. president has directly embraced this school.
Key attributes:
- View China and Russia as the greatest challenges to U.S. primacy in the international system and seek to exert maximum pressure to counter U.S. adversaries and project American power
- Prioritize U.S. national interests, even if at the expense of allies, and favor strategic interests over democratic values or a “rules-based order”—but support U.S. alliances while skeptical of allies’ willingness to act
- Are distrustful of the United Nations and international agreements and favor U.S. withdrawal from international institutions where necessary to avoid restraints on U.S. power and sovereignty
- Support using military force to advance U.S. interests
Prominent voices: Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, John Bolton
Recent U.S. presidents: None
Republican candidates: None
2. Democratic Internationalists
Defining worldview: Democratic internationalists believe that defending democracy is essential to maintaining U.S. and global security and prioritize working with like-minded allies to advance shared values and a rules-based democratic order. This school has been predominant among elected U.S. leaders—across both political parties—since President Harry Truman declared it was the policy of the United States to help “free and independent nations to maintain their freedom.”
Key attributes:
- View strategic competition between democracy and autocracy as the major fault line in the international system and support proactive measures to defend against revisionist autocracies, namely China and Russia
- Are strong proponents of democratic alliances and solidarity and are eager to maintain the United States’ role as the “leader of the free world”
- Support robust efforts to advance democratic values and human rights and to hold autocratic regimes to account for war crimes and violent oppression
- Are willing to consider use of force if necessary to defend democracy and the rules-based order
Prominent voices: Madeleine Albright, John McCain, Mitt Romney, Chris Coons, G. John Ikenberry, Hal Brands
Recent U.S. presidents: Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, Joe Biden
Republican candidates: Chris Christie, Nikki Haley, Mike Pence
3. Realist Internationalists
Defining worldview: Realist internationalists believe that U.S. power should be utilized to defend more narrow strategic interests and prioritize pragmatic engagement with all nations to help preserve global and regional stability. Former National Security Advisors Brent Scowcroft and Henry Kissinger were quintessential practitioners of this school, which was also embraced by the presidents they served.
Key attributes:
- View great-power rivalry as inevitable in the global system and support U.S. alliances and active efforts to deter rival powers and maintain global order
- Are willing to engage adversaries and work with all nations, regardless of regime type, to advance strategic objectives
- Are prepared to make mutual accommodations with rivals, or seek to divide them, to achieve a stable balance of power
- Are inclined to “accept the world as it is” and are wary of U.S. intervention and democracy promotion efforts
- Support a strong U.S. defense posture and are willing to use force when required to defend vital national interests
Prominent voices: Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Robert Gates, Richard Haass, Stephen Krasner, Charles Kupchan
Recent U.S. presidents: Richard Nixon, George H.W. Bush
Republican candidates: Ron DeSantis
4. Multilateral Internationalists
Defining worldview: Multilateral internationalists believe that peaceful coexistence with other nations should be a key objective and prioritize working through the U.N. and other multilateral institutions to solve global challenges and uphold international norms. President Barack Obama’s foreign policy was steeped in this school, now represented by former Secretary of State John Kerry, who is currently serving as the United States’ chief climate negotiator.
Key attributes:
- Are wary of great-power rivalry and strategic competition and are eager to “extend a hand” and find areas of common ground with adversaries
- Support active U.S. engagement to advance global norms, good governance, and human rights
- Seek to cooperate with all nations to address transnational challenges, with a particular priority on climate change
- Prefer to engage through inclusive institutions but support working with U.S. alliances to foster a rules-based order
- Are disinclined to use military force and will consider it only when authorized by the U.N. Security Council
Prominent voices: John Kerry, Bruce Jones
Recent U.S. presidents: Barack Obama
Republican candidates: None
Non-Internationalists
1. Retractors
Defining worldview: Retractors believe that the world is taking advantage of the United States and support a more transactional foreign policy that seeks to retract the United States from global commitments and maximize pecuniary benefits. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy epitomizes this school. But its adherents date back to Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan in the late 1990s and the America First movement of the 1930s that sought to keep the United States out of World War II.
Key attributes:
- Are deeply cynical about values and norms and seek and are prone to conspiracy theories and suspect the role of the “deep state” in manipulating U.S. policy
- Are critical of alliances and disdainful of U.S. allies, particularly in Europe, and believe efforts to cooperate through international institutions are naive and self-defeating
- Seek to “make deals” with autocratic regimes and are dismissive of democratic values and international norms
- Emphasize economic protectionism and closed borders to prevent others from “ripping America off”
- Believe the United States is militarily overcommitted but support occasional limited military actions to “act tough” and demonstrate U.S. prowess
Prominent voices: Michael Anton
Recent U.S. presidents: Donald Trump
Republican candidates: Donald Trump, Vivek Ramaswamy
2. Restrainers
Defining worldview: Restrainers believe that the United States is overstretched and overcommitted and support a more restrained foreign policy that significantly reduces the country’s global footprint. While still largely on the margins, this school has gained some prominence in recent years, as reflected by the emergence of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and its adherents.
Key attributes:
- Are distrustful of U.S. power and influence in the international system and believe that the United States has no standing to promote democratic values or a rules-based order, given its own flawed democracy, hypocrisy, and imperialism
- Believe the United States has picked unnecessary fights with adversaries and that its overseas military posture, alliances, and sanctions policies are often overly provocative
- Are wary of “inflating” threats posed by China and Russia and favor diplomatic efforts to cooperate with adversaries and reach a mutual accommodation and view a nationalistic foreign policy as arrogant and distasteful
- Seek to reduce the U.S. military presence overseas and to scale back commitments to NATO and other alliances and vigorously oppose the use of force
Prominent voices: Rand Paul, Bernie Sanders, Andrew Bacevich, Stephen M. Walt, Stephen Wertheim
Recent U.S. presidents: None
Republican candidates: None
Several key points follow from this analysis. First, admittedly, the edges of these camps are fuzzy, and policymakers may often find themselves straddling one or more of these camps, especially on specific issues. Nevertheless, these six schools are sufficiently discrete and represent the primary worldviews that are influencing the contemporary debate on how the United States should conduct its foreign policy.
Second, many of these schools tend to cross partisan lines. Democratic internationalism, for example, has been enthusiastically embraced by political leaders on both sides of the aisle and has strong bipartisan constituencies, as reflected in pro-democracy institutions such as the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute. Realism has also had a long tradition in U.S. foreign policy, resonating with national security practitioners across both parties. Similarly, the restraint school draws support among both progressives on the left and libertarians looking for Washington to scale back its global commitments. On the other hand, unilateral internationalism has found a home mainly among conservatives, while multilateral internationalism draws support mostly from liberals. In recent years, retraction has become the policy of choice among pro-Trump Republicans.
Third, determining where recent U.S. presidents fall on this spectrum is not axiomatic. While they may be inclined toward a particular camp as they enter office, most presidents are not purists, and as they govern, many find themselves running up against practical and political realities that make it difficult to maintain a consistent and predictable foreign-policy governing philosophy.
Barack Obama, for example, seemed drawn toward realist internationalism, pursuing a “reset” in relations with Russia and later declining to commit U.S. force to hold Syrian President Bashar al-Assad accountable for his use of chemical weapons. But given the priority Obama placed on engaging adversaries such as Cuba and Iran and working through the United Nations, the main thrust of his foreign policy appeared more consistent with multilateral internationalism.
George W. Bush also straddled various camps. In launching the global war on terrorism, Bush seemed determined to assert U.S. primacy and appeared to be leaning toward unilateral internationalism. But with his emphasis on democracy promotion in Iraq and Afghanistan, his signature Freedom Agenda, and his call for “ending tyranny in our world” in his second inaugural address, Bush’s overall worldview appeared to be more grounded in democratic internationalism.
Where Biden falls is still up for debate. Currently, the Biden national security team is split between realists, who pressed for Biden to withdraw from Afghanistan and reengage with Saudi Crown Prince Muhammed bin Sultan, and democratic internationalists, who championed the president’s initiative to organize a Summit for Democracy. However, given Biden’s steadfast commitment to work with NATO to defend a democratic Ukraine and his conviction that the world is facing a “global struggle between democracy and autocracy,” the broad arc of the Biden administration’s foreign policy so far seems to be more consistent with democratic internationalism—though a more definitive judgment will have to wait until his presidency concludes.
So where does this leave the current slate of Republican candidates? Pence and Haley, as well as former New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie, all of whom have called for standing up against Russian aggression and have denounced China’s human rights violations, are squarely in the democratic internationalist camp. Donald Trump, of course, has his own lane. DeSantis and Ramaswamy, on the other hand, appear caught between realism and Trumpian retraction, as they battle for support among the Republican rank and file who are skeptical of U.S. global engagement. DeSantis favors a pivot away from Ukraine and toward China—a very realist way to think about trade-offs. Ramaswamy, who has called for a strategy to split Russia and China, also sounds like a realist at times, but his stance on extricating the United States from any involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war, potentially ceding Taiwan to China, and putting the “interests of America first” seems to suggest he is veering toward retraction.
While voters may not consider foreign policy to be central to their vote for the next president, how U.S. leaders choose to engage in the world is critical to the security and prosperity of the American people. By gaining a clearer understanding of the most influential foreign-policy schools of thought, voters—and indeed the candidates themselves—will be in a better position to make informed choices.
The post The Scrambled Spectrum of U.S. Foreign-Policy Thinking appeared first on Foreign Policy.
