As the NATO summit in Vilnius approaches, many are wondering if the alliance will offer Ukraine a clear path to membership. Early notes of caution from Washington and Berlin suggest that the odds are slim, notwithstanding intense pressure from countries on NATO’s eastern flank.
In his recent FP piece, John R. Deni argued that postponing the conversation about Ukraine’s place in NATO is the right thing to do. Talking about Ukraine’s membership is premature, he writes, and distracts from the expansion of Western aid needed to secure Ukraine’s victory.
That view is mistaken. In fact, a clear, believable commitment to bring Ukraine into the alliance as soon as the war is over, ideally with a formal cease-fire or peace agreement, is the West’s best chance to bring the war to an early end.
Deni’s piece presents three categories of argument against bringing Ukraine into the alliance. (I am presenting those arguments here in a different order than he did.)
First, Ukraine is not ready politically for membership—and, because of Russia’s aggression, fails the alliance’s requirement of having no unresolved border disputes. Second, a path toward NATO membership would “[play] into Putin’s misinformation campaign on the war,” turn the Russian dictator’s “propaganda into prophecy,” and strengthen his grip over Russian politics. Third, the prospect of Ukraine in NATO would boost “Russia’s will to persist, prolonging what is already Europe’s bloodiest conflict since World War II.”
The first category of objections largely elevates process over substance. To be sure, nobody is suggesting that Ukraine join in the middle of a shooting war with Russia and thereby draw the alliance into an ongoing conflict. The events of the past 15 months demonstrate, however, just how unwise it was to accord Russia a veto over future NATO members by virtue of forcibly annexing small chunks of their territory—as it sought to do in Georgia and Ukraine.
Moreover, the argument fails on its own legalistic merits. While Russia is illegally occupying parts of Ukraine, Ukraine’s legal borders are not being disputed in any meaningful way. The country’s borders were recognized by the international community, including repeatedly by Russia—in 1991, through agreements establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States; in 1994, in the Budapest Memorandum; as well as in 1997, in the bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership. Russia’s claims to Ukraine’s territories, including the fake referendums, have been dismissed by the U.N. General Assembly.
If the war ended with a peace treaty between Ukraine and Russia, involving mutually agreed transfers of territory, the “disputed borders” objection would disappear. But it makes no material sense for the West to accord Ukraine a different treatment if the war ends only with a cease-fire falling short of legally ratifying Moscow’s control over parts of Ukraine’s territory—especially given that doing so would likely be a career-ender for any Ukrainian leader.
As for the question of Ukraine’s political readiness, one only has to wonder how Salazar’s Portugal in 1949 would fare in Deni’s assessment, or Turkey and Greece in 1952, the latter just three years removed from a brutal civil war. In all three cases, the benefits of bringing the countries into the alliance to defend Europe from the threat of Soviet communism outweighed concerns about the soundness of their domestic institutions. In the case of Ukraine, which has more than proved its usefulness in helping to secure the alliance’s eastern flank, the calculus should be the same.
The second argument, revolving around concerns over playing into the hands of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s propaganda, is also a part of the reason that brought the world to where we are today. In 2008, Ukraine and Georgia were denied NATO membership with the purpose of not rattling Putin’s regime. Lo and behold, both of them have since been routinely victimized by Russia, precisely because they lack the defensive shield the alliance would provide; similarly, Moldova has been repeatedly threatened.
Western aid to Ukraine plays into Russian propaganda, too—it allows Putin to claim that he is fighting not merely against a dysfunctional neighboring country but against the joint might of the West. If foreign-policy choices of the United States and its allies are to be constrained by the requirement of not providing welcome talking points for Russia’s warmongers and propagandists, then the West will have no choice but to retreat—in Ukraine and everywhere else.
The third objection, that the prospect of Ukraine’s NATO membership would boost Russian resolve to fight, appears the strongest. Yet it fails to consider Putin’s options for escalation. For one, as the pitiful display of historic armor on Moscow’s Red Square on May 9 illustrated, such options are limited. The regime’s bluster about nuclear weapons aside, there is no indication that the Russian leader has joined a death cult, nor would a tactical nuclear attack against Ukraine change the situation on the battlefield to his advantage.
Will Putin try to hold onto the territory he has grabbed for as long as he can? Of course. But what the concern over the war’s duration leaves out is Ukraine and its agency. In fact, one can argue, what is likely to make this war a long one is primarily Ukraine’s strategic need to reconquer its land in its entirety so as to prevent a future Russian invasion.
As long as Russia controls the land bridge connecting the Donbas with Crimea, and indeed Crimea itself, the Kremlin enjoys a launchpad for new attacks against Ukraine. A much larger part of Ukraine’s territory falls within the range of Russian missiles, and Ukraine is also cut off from much of its Black Sea coast, making its export-oriented industries and agriculture vulnerable.
NATO membership would largely obviate such concerns. At first glance, the Baltic States are indefensible if faced with a Russian invasion. In practice, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians sleep soundly at night knowing that Putin is not foolish enough to launch a war against the alliance.
To be sure, Ukraine must be the ultimate arbiter of how far it wants to go in its war effort. Even with the prospect of joining the alliance, Ukrainians may still want to restore full territorial integrity of their country within its internationally recognized borders as a matter of principle and also to liberate their fellow citizens suffering under Russian occupation.
Yet the strategic pressure to do so, in order to secure the viability of Ukraine as a country, would be greatly reduced by having Article 5 guarantees in sight. Instead of offering a path to membership, Deni advocates “significantly expanding Western military assistance.”
We have no disagreement there, though one has to wonder about the political feasibility of what he proposes. After all, even if Western aid is not forthcoming on the scale that he suggests, Ukrainians will not stop fighting. The combination of no timely prospect of joining NATO and insufficient Western assistance will drive home in Kyiv the sense that Ukrainians are fighting alone.
In those circumstances, it is exceedingly unlikely that the Ukrainians will show much deference to U.S. and European interests either in their execution of the war or in their future alliances. And that would be as much of a loss for the United States as it would be for Ukraine.
The post Don’t Delay Ukraine’s Path to NATO Membership appeared first on Foreign Policy.
