The Russian foreign minister’s recent tour of Africa may have been unannounced, but it was not unexpected. In his second trip in eight months, Sergey Lavrov visited Eswatini, Botswana, Angola, and South Africa. In February, he will visit Mali, Tunisia, Mauritania, Algeria, and Morocco. Across the continent, he and his colleagues will likely promote the view that Russia is an anti-imperialist force, instrumentalizing positive memories of Soviet support for various African wars of independence against exploitative Western colonialists. Moscow has long used “memory diplomacy” in Africa—invoking positive memories of the past to bolster its influence and interests—but now these tactics are standing in the way of Ukraine’s soft power.
“Russia was among the few world powers that neither had colonies in Africa or elsewhere nor participated in [the] slave trade throughout its history. Russia helped, in every possible way, the peoples of the African continent to attain their freedom and sovereignty.”
This is the message that the Russian Embassy in South Africa, one of the Kremlin’s more vociferous consular social media accounts, released to mark Abolition of Slavery Day on Dec. 2, 2022. Twitter users were quick with rejoinders that Russia’s lack of colonies in Africa was not for want of trying and that, in any case, it had subjugated peoples in Asia and Eastern Europe. More importantly, Russia’s self-depiction as anti-colonial struck many as outrageously cynical when that same country is simultaneously pursuing an imperial war of conquest against its neighbor Ukraine.
The Russian foreign minister’s recent tour of Africa may have been unannounced, but it was not unexpected. In his second trip in eight months, Sergey Lavrov visited Eswatini, Botswana, Angola, and South Africa. In February, he will visit Mali, Tunisia, Mauritania, Algeria, and Morocco. Across the continent, he and his colleagues will likely promote the view that Russia is an anti-imperialist force, instrumentalizing positive memories of Soviet support for various African wars of independence against exploitative Western colonialists. Moscow has long used “memory diplomacy” in Africa—invoking positive memories of the past to bolster its influence and interests—but now these tactics are standing in the way of Ukraine’s soft power.
“Russia was among the few world powers that neither had colonies in Africa or elsewhere nor participated in [the] slave trade throughout its history. Russia helped, in every possible way, the peoples of the African continent to attain their freedom and sovereignty.”
This is the message that the Russian Embassy in South Africa, one of the Kremlin’s more vociferous consular social media accounts, released to mark Abolition of Slavery Day on Dec. 2, 2022. Twitter users were quick with rejoinders that Russia’s lack of colonies in Africa was not for want of trying and that, in any case, it had subjugated peoples in Asia and Eastern Europe. More importantly, Russia’s self-depiction as anti-colonial struck many as outrageously cynical when that same country is simultaneously pursuing an imperial war of conquest against its neighbor Ukraine.
This tweet, however, isn’t just another attempt by the attention-seeking Russian Foreign Ministry to provoke reactions through trolling or promote itself as a reliable ally and friend to African elites: It is also part of Russia’s own self-conceptualization. While some have slapped the labels of malign influence and disinformation on Russia’s diplomatic language in Africa, it would be more productive to examine the resonance of Russia’s narrative than the narratives themselves, even if they are clearly delivered in bad faith and self-interest. The willingness of some African countries to embrace Russia’s claim of a shared struggle against the West often has more to do with the painful and enduring experience of imperialism than a love of Russia. With the right framing, Ukraine could not only undermine Russia’s arguments but even take advantage of this anti-imperialist sentiment.
Many Russians are, in fact, reluctant to view their country as an empire, arguing that the Soviet Union and even the Russian Empire could not be described as imperial in the same way as Britain or France because Russians lived alongside their colonized subjects and intermarried. Narratives of Russia as a self-colonizer persist throughout history: “The history of Russia is the history of a country that colonizes itself.” This phrase, first coined by the historian Sergey Solovyov in the 1840s, gained widespread popularity thanks to Vasily Klyuchevsky’s five-volume work, The Course of Russian History, published between 1904 and 1921 and still referenced regularly by historians today.
This colonial exceptionalism, or refusal to acknowledge the colonial nature of Russia’s political structures, is not based solely on the contiguity of Russia’s empires but rather on the official and long-standing claim that Russia did not conquer Siberia. Instead, it was invited and welcomed by the peoples living there, who entered into union freely with Russia. Popular Russian history books and documentaries even claim that minorities were treated better than Russians, with Russia an “inverted empire” in which the peripheries exploited the center. This train of thought, popularized by former Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, is often used today by politicians and pro-Kremlin media, books, and television series to discredit the Baltic States when they discuss their countries’ exploitation at the hands of the Soviet authorities.
Even Russia’s current war in Ukraine, despite all its imperial accoutrements, is depicted by Russian media and politicians as a war of liberation, not just to free Russian-speaking Ukrainians but also to overcome Western—especially U.S.-led—hegemony. This line of thinking was summarized by Andrey Bezrukov, a professor at a leading Moscow university and former intelligence officer, in a June 2022 article in which he explained Russia’s war on Ukraine: “[F]or us this is, in essence, a liberating special operation (against the United States and Great Britain) for independence, it is anti-colonial.” Russians identify with the colonized and, seeing Ukrainians as Russian, cast themselves as the anti-imperialists, fighting the United States’ and the West’s political, cultural, and normative hegemony.
The Russian government has been adept at appropriating the history of Soviet support for a number of African struggles for independence and using it to bolster its image among many countries on the continent. But this is about more than nostalgia; it is about how Russian diplomats have been able to frame their war against Ukraine as a defensive response to Western aggression. In this view, Russia is not seeking to dominate Ukraine but striving for multipolarity, standing up to the West in a modern-day version of the anti-imperial struggles fought by African nations.
The Kremlin has been expending time, energy, and resources on convincing Africa of this vision, with some success. Russian ambassadors and diplomats have used public events, conferences, and media in countries from Algeria to Zimbabwe to celebrate and commemorate Soviet support for anti-colonial movements. During his most recent visit, Lavrov directly compared Russia’s war to “liberate” Ukraine from external Western influence with the Angolan War of Independence. Such comparisons are part of a wide spectrum of Russian diplomatic activities aimed at deepening alliances and cultural influence, from opening monuments to Soviet soldiers who fought in Angola’s Civil War to writing op-eds for Zimbabwean newspapers revisiting the Soviet Union’s liberating mission.
The strategy is effective because much of Africa holds positive memories of Soviet support for independence movements during the Cold War, and large numbers of African elites graduated from universities such as the Moscow-based Russian University of the Friendship of Nations. Those unable to study in Russia can join a new Africa-focused social network called Russosphère (Russian sphere), which launched around the same time as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The site already has tens of thousands of users who critique the French, dismissing them as modern-day colonialists, and celebrating the Wagner mercenary group, which has been widely accused of committing atrocities in the Central African Republic and elsewhere. Ironically, a BBC investigation found the man behind the network, Luc Michel, is from Belgium, another former colonial power.
These platforms, visits, and events are also used to discredit Western criticism of Russia. For example, during his first-ever visit to the Republic of Congo and meeting with President Denis Sassou Nguesso in summer 2022, Lavrov spent time discussing how the West colonized Africa for its own benefit.
Russian officials use such narratives to build ties with African countries, promising bilateral relations based on trust, equality, and respect for territorial integrity. Unlike the West, Lavrov depicts Russia as a defender of sovereignty that would never interfere in internal affairs. This line of argument resonates in some parts of the African continent, especially among those who suffered the most egregiously and recently from colonialism and slavery at the hands of the West. This was reflected in the president of Uganda’s assertion that “whenever issues come up and some people want us to take positions against Russia, we say: These people have stood with us for the last 100 years. How can we be automatically against them?”
Similarly, the ruling African National Congress party in South Africa has cited Soviet support against the apartheid regime as a driving factor in its close relations with Moscow. Following Lavrov’s January visit, South Africa will take part in Russia-led military drills scheduled for around the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
After all, (almost) nobody is denying that the West colonized Africa and has failed to make appropriate amends, or that the Soviet Union genuinely did support a number of African liberation movements in their struggles against colonial powers and the United States. The issue is that Russia and the Soviet Union have been colonizing forces elsewhere and have no right to any moral high ground—though that doesn’t make the anger to which Russian narratives appeal any less righteous or powerful. Instead, the narrative should be ceded to other countries without an imperial history, countries that were colonized by Russia. First and foremost, this should mean Ukraine.
Ukraine has a number of diplomatic interests in Africa, not least to maintain international pressure on Russia to adhere to the Turkey-brokered grain deal that has the potential to seriously disrupt food supplies to Africa. Other interests include U.N. votes and widening international support, which is why Ukrainian diplomats have so far focused their efforts on countries they perceive as strategically important in this regard—Kenya, Senegal, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast.
There is evidence that some African leaders already view Russia as the imperialist aggressor and relate to Ukraine’s position, as seen in the words of Martin Kimani, Kenya’s permanent representative to the United Nations. Explaining why Kenya joined 93 other countries in supporting a U.N. resolution calling for Russia to compensate Ukraine, he drew parallels between Russian and Western imperialism: “This is the right of Ukraine [to have reparations] but also for all the peoples and countries that are seeking reparations for colonial violence and dispossession, slavery, and other acts of aggression by powerful states, including members of the Security Council.” Although many African countries abstained or were absent, a number voted for the resolution, including Somalia, Djibouti, and Ghana, which had been the target of Russian memory diplomacy during the summer of 2019.
During his October visit to Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Kenya, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba sought to challenge Russia’s narrative across a wide range of issues, from grain deliveries to NATO.
The continent remains a battleground for influence. In this light, while it is difficult for ministers to leave the country, it could be worth tasking embassies with identifying any Ukrainian Soviet heroes or major actors who assisted anti-colonial struggles, organizing research, conferences, or evening dinners in their honor to raise Ukraine’s profile in-country.
Another way to tap into unused sources of Ukrainian soft power include developing current and past alumni networks. Prior to Feb. 24, 2022, there were close to 20,000 African students in Ukraine. Given the (admittedly panicked) Ukrainian border guards’ poor treatment of some African students as they tried to flee the advancing Russian military, it is important for Ukraine to address this issue by engaging with affected alumni. Kyiv should look beyond recent students, however. Russian media frequently reference Soviet education as a source of their soft power in the Middle East, especially Syria, and Africa, but many of these same students studied in Kyiv and Kharkiv—not Moscow. Ukraine could arrange receptions for them, similar to those held by Russian embassies across Africa.
Ukrainian politicians have demonstrated a willingness to engage with Africa and a readiness to embrace positive elements of the Soviet legacy. Ukrainian memory diplomacy aimed at colonized peoples within the Russian Federation has been well-pitched, as with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s video speech rallying the people of the Caucasus nations against the war, delivered in front of a memorial to the Chechen hero Imam Shamil, which drew on a shared experience of Russian colonization and fights for independence.
If Ukraine were able to adapt these stories for audiences beyond the Caucasus, this could be a productive path of development. These stories would likely be very effective, not so much because of Zelensky’s communication skills or the resonance of the issue, although both are considerable, but because Ukraine would be telling the truth: Ukraine is in a brutal war of colonization, fighting for its freedom, standing on the side of the oppressed. It isn’t just a story.
The post Why Russia Markets Itself as an Anti-Colonial Power to Africans appeared first on Foreign Policy.
