When former U.S. President John F. Kennedy was a member of Congress in the 1950s, he was among a group of legislative members in the House of Representatives and Senate who sought to end the U.S. arms embargo on Israel. Despite this pressure, then-President Dwight D. Eisenhower would not budge, believing that the Tripartite Declaration of 1950—in which the United States, France, and the United Kingdom agreed not to sell weapons to regional belligerents—was the best way to prevent war in the Middle East. When Kennedy was elected president, he broke from the agreement and sold the U.S.-made Hawk air defense systems to the Jewish state, a decision that represented the beginning of the U.S.-Israel defense relationship as the world has come to know it.
In mid-January, the Biden administration asked Israel to send these 1950s-era Hawk systems, which have been in storage, to Kyiv to help the Ukrainians defend against a barrage of Russian missiles and Iranian drones. The Israelis reportedly refused.
It was a stunning decision by a country that has both enjoyed $107,806,200,000 in military assistance from the United States between 1946 and 2021 and whose population (like Ukraine’s) is forced to live under the threat of rockets, missiles, and drones—a number of which are also derived from Iranian technology. Israel’s leaders have continued to carry on their “war between the wars”—attacking Iranians and their proxies in Syria and sometimes Iraq to ensure the Israeli population remains secure—including an attack on Iranian facilities this past weekend that U.S. officials reportedly attributed to the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service. Yet, at the same time, the Israelis seem to be denying even ancient and unused technology to the Ukrainians to secure their own population.
When former U.S. President John F. Kennedy was a member of Congress in the 1950s, he was among a group of legislative members in the House of Representatives and Senate who sought to end the U.S. arms embargo on Israel. Despite this pressure, then-President Dwight D. Eisenhower would not budge, believing that the Tripartite Declaration of 1950—in which the United States, France, and the United Kingdom agreed not to sell weapons to regional belligerents—was the best way to prevent war in the Middle East. When Kennedy was elected president, he broke from the agreement and sold the U.S.-made Hawk air defense systems to the Jewish state, a decision that represented the beginning of the U.S.-Israel defense relationship as the world has come to know it.
In mid-January, the Biden administration asked Israel to send these 1950s-era Hawk systems, which have been in storage, to Kyiv to help the Ukrainians defend against a barrage of Russian missiles and Iranian drones. The Israelis reportedly refused.
It was a stunning decision by a country that has both enjoyed $107,806,200,000 in military assistance from the United States between 1946 and 2021 and whose population (like Ukraine’s) is forced to live under the threat of rockets, missiles, and drones—a number of which are also derived from Iranian technology. Israel’s leaders have continued to carry on their “war between the wars”—attacking Iranians and their proxies in Syria and sometimes Iraq to ensure the Israeli population remains secure—including an attack on Iranian facilities this past weekend that U.S. officials reportedly attributed to the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service. Yet, at the same time, the Israelis seem to be denying even ancient and unused technology to the Ukrainians to secure their own population.
However, no one should be shocked by Israel’s apparent decision to hold onto the Hawks.
Since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the Israeli government—much like the Turkish government—has played a double game, offering rhetorical support for Ukrainian independence and providing humanitarian aid to Kyiv. At least the Turks are willing to sell the Ukrainians weaponry. The Israelis, in contrast, are scrupulously avoiding any policies that will damage Jerusalem’s ties to Moscow.
The primary reason for this is security. The Russians have a major presence in Syria and its airspace. For Israel to be able to go after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or its proxies on Syrian territory, Israeli pilots need to deconflict with the Russians. Putin has been mostly happy to oblige the Israelis, because although he and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei agree on ensuring the survival of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the Russians have wanted the Iranians to be the junior partner in that effort. Israel’s periodic and withering strikes on the IRGC with the Kremlin’s quiet assent have reinforced Putin’s approach.
Even if much of the Israel-Russia relationship is about Syria and security, there is more to these ties. Israel’s leaders almost reflexively define the country as both democratic and part of the West, but worldview matters. And as Israeli politics have moved steadily to the right under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s stewardship, Jerusalem has forged ties with countries that do not fall into either category.
Political affinities based on nationalism, identity, antipathy to liberalism, and hostility to Muslims seem to have played a role in driving Israel’s ties to a constellation of illiberal countries—notably Russia, Hungary, Poland, India, and Brazil under former President Jair Bolsonaro. Of course, these affinities do not always pull in the same direction. Poland is a leading supporter of Ukraine and proved its enormous value in what U.S. President Joe Biden has defined as a struggle between democracy and tyranny. Still, even though the leaders of Poland’s ruling Law and Justice party share many aspects of Putin’s outlook, the country remains an illiberal democracy, and Israel is pulling in the same direction.
Netanyahu does not seem to be a natural cultural warrior, preferring to emphasize security and how good he is at providing it for Israelis, but at moments of crisis he has demonstrated his willingness to use racist dog whistles and throw his lot in with illiberal politicians. In an effort to get out the vote in 2015, for instance, he warned Jewish Israelis via Facebook: “The right-wing government is in danger. Arab voters are coming out in droves to the polls. Left-wing organizations are busing them out.” And of course, more recently, he made common cause with Israel’s nationalist, illiberal, religious right, whose leaders share the ideological inclinations of the global right—of which the Russian president is a leader.
Israeli Minister of Public Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, and Avi Maoz—a deputy minister in the prime minister’s office whose portfolio seems to be solely related to fostering his particular interpretation of Jewish identity—have no apparent commitment to democracy. These officials seem more interested in leveraging Israel’s democratic practices to advance their non-democratic agenda. Although Netanyahu’s coalition is made up of parties that collectively garnered fewer votes than other parties, Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, Maoz, and others are acting as if they have an overwhelming mandate to tilt power in favor of the Knesset, where they and their allies currently hold a slim majority.
The press has focused a fair amount on Netanyahu’s parochial interest in making changes to laws that would allow him to escape prosecution for corruption. From one perspective, that is the least the prime minister’s partners can do for him in exchange for allowing them to alter how justices for the Supreme Court are chosen and providing Israel’s legislature the power to overrule the country’s highest court. This change could allow the government to expand Israeli control over the West Bank, undermine the rights of non-Jewish Israelis, and firmly situate Israeli identity within a specifically Orthodox version of what constitutes Jewishness. Included in this would be a significant change to Israel’s “Law of Return,” which has been critical in connecting Jews around the world to Israel. In addition, Israel’s tolerant environment for the LGBTQ community is in jeopardy as Maoz—who openly espouses homophobic views—vows to pursue an anti-gay and anti-trans agenda, a hallmark of the illiberal global right.
What is happening (or may happen) in Israel aligns with what has happened in other illiberal states, including Russia. Politicians have hollowed out, bent, and undermined institutions to lock in their power and pursue illiberal policies in the name of some ostensibly greater cause, notably nationalism, identity, and religion. Israel’s political system has long had trouble reconciling democratic principles with the ethno-religious nationalism that is very much a part of Zionism.
Over the better part of almost 75 years, Israelis have sought to manage the contradictions and problems these competing impulses created, but the new government does not care to manage them. Instead, it seeks to reinforce an avowedly Jewish state based on a particular understanding of Judaism that does not try to accommodate those who fall outside the category of acceptable Jewishness.
Israel is on a political trajectory that places it among illiberal states in the world. It would be inaccurate to suggest that Israel is just like Russia, which is just like India, which is just like Hungary. Yet leaders in all of these countries share a similar outlook about how to organize their societies. So, yes, it is true that Jerusalem’s ties to Moscow are intertwined with its security concerns and the emergency that is Iran’s presence in Syria. But for those who think of Israel as a Western-oriented democracy, its relationships with Russia and other illiberal states are much more consequential than that.
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